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Abstract 
Auditor-Client negotiation about difficult client accounting issues involves the auditor, 
the client, and various other parties on both the client and auditor side. On the auditor 
side, the Professional Practice Department has been reported to play a significant role in 
the financial reporting process, yet is rarely the focus of academic study. In this study, I 
investigate how communicating the involvement of the Professional Practice Department 
(PPD) to top management using different influence techniques impacts negotiated 
outcomes between audit partners and top management. I examine the impact of 
communicating the involvement of the PPD in the context of two other variables found in 
prior auditing literature to be important in the negotiation process, auditor type and CFO 
(Chief Financial Officer) preferred auditor-type. While auditors must attest that the 
financial statements are free from material misstatement, they also must ensure they 
foster a functional working relationship with the client. The auditor-client context is 
unique, and takes place within an on-going relationship where expectations and 
preferences have been established. Therefore, I examine these negotiation outcomes 
while incorporating a key contextual variable, auditor-type, in the negotiations. Both the 
CFO's preference for auditor-type, as well as actual auditor-type will be examined in 
addition to the specific influence tactic. I use a 3x2x2 fully factorial design to 
experimentally analyze the impact of two manipulated variable (influence tactic and 
auditor-type) and one measured variable (CFO preference for auditor-type) on two 
dependent variables. The two dependent variables are the CFO's willingness to post an 
adjustment to the financial statements and the CFO's satisfaction with the audit partner. I 
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report the results of an audit negotiation experiment in which 154 highly experienced 
CFOs responded to a case scenario that incorporated or measured the three key variables 
(influence tactic communicating PPD involvement, auditor-type and CFO preference for 
auditor type). My results indicate that using the most aggressive influence tactic to 
communicate the Professional Practice Department's involvement had a mixed effect on 
the CFOs willingness to post adjustments to the financial statements. The CFOs in this 
influence condition that were paired with an accommodating auditor-type reported a 
higher willingness to adjust the financial statements while CFOs paired with a proactive 
and advising auditor-type reported a lower willingness to post adjustments. All CFOs 
reported less satisfaction with the audit partner when the most aggressive influence tactic 
was used to communicate the Professional Practice Department's inyolvement. 
Furthermore, the CFO's preference for an auditor-type significantly affects negotiation 
outcomes. CFOs that prefer more proactive and advising audit partners are more likely to 
post adjustments to the financial statements, regardless of whether or not. they are 
informed of the Professional Practice Department's involvement. These same CFOs 
report a high level of satisfaction with the audit partner and their satisfaction is not 
impacted by the type of audit partner they are paired with. CFOs that prefer more 
reactive and accommodating audit partners are less willing to adjust the financial 
statements and report less satisfaction (dissatisfaction), when paired with proactive and 
advising audit partners. These results highlight the importance of the existing 
relationship within the auditor-client dyads and help support findings from auditor-client 
negotiation research which show that prevailing expectations of the CFO are a 
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contextually important feature of audit negotiation and should be incorporated into more 
research. I also show that aggressive tactics can help persuade some CFOs to adjust the 
financial statements; however, consistently pushing too aggressively results in reduced 
cooperation. Furthermore, there are large costs in terms of the CFO's satisfaction with 
the audit partner in using aggressive tactics, and therefore, practically speaking the tactic 
that could potentially be the most effective may result in a lost client. 
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Audit Negotiations: The Effect of Communicating Involvement of the Professional 
Practice Department and Auditor-Type on Negotiated Outcomes 
"The goal of our consultation approach is to provide the right answer, the answer that 
will stand up to scrutiny" (Deloitte & Touche, 2002). 
1.0 Introduction 
In recent years, several high-profile accounting scandals have turned a spotlight on the 
accounting profession and the quality of financial statements. 1 Regulators and the 
accountants themselves are instituting practices focused on attaining the highest quality 
of financial statements. One of these enhanced audit quality control practices is the 
emphasis on consulting others within the professional accounting firm. In a report 
entitled "Integrity & Quality," Deloitte & Touche (2002, p. 2) states: "Our approach is 
based on the simple premise that no one can or should know everything. It is an 
approach that neither breeds nor tolerates 'lone rangers'." 
As businesses increased in complexity, accounting standard setters followed suit with a 
proliferation of standards and pronouncements. Accounting firms responded by creating 
Professional Practice Departments (PPD) to assist partners in researching complex 
1 As discussed in Beattie, Fearnley & Brandt (2004), quality refers to whether the outcome of the financial 
reports reflects 'good' or 'bad' accounting as perceived by external parties. 
accounting issues (Danos & Boley, 1980). These departments have become an integral 
component of the audit quality control mechanism within the firms. The PPD is an 
organizational unit within a public accounting firm with a mandate to assist audit partners 
in making judgments related to a client's financial statements (Danos & Boley, 1980; 
Salterio, 1994; Salterio & Denham, 1997). 2 Audit partners are required to consult the 
PPD i.n certain circumstances and can choose to consult them in others (Deloitte & 
Touche, 2002; Deloitte & Touche, 2008; Ernst & Young, 2008; KPMG, 2008; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). In recent studies, the PPD has been shown to be 
involved frequently in audit negotiations, with their advice playing an important role in 
the process (Gibbins, Salterio, & Webb, 2001; Gibbins, McCracken, & Salterio, 2005; 
McCracken, Salterio, & Gibbins, 2008). 3 This role will only become more important as 
business and standards become more complex, as the majority of audit negotiations arise 
from change, including changes in standards (Gibbins, McCracken, & Salterio, 2007). 
Therefore, with the myriad of changes taking place within the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), the exponential growth and innovation in business and 
finance, and the technological change and complexity in business, audit negotiation and 
PPD involvement in those negotiations will become an even more important and relevant 
topic. As the PPD becomes more of an integral part of the auditing process, it is 
important to understand how communicating their involvement impacts audit 
negotiations. In this paper, I investigate how informing the client of the involvement of 
2 Although accounting firms use various terminologies, the term "Professional Practice Department" (PPD) 
will be used in this paper. 
3 Negotiation is defined as "any context in which two or more parties with differing preferences jointly 
make decisions that affect the welfare of both (all) parties" (Murnigham & Bazerman, 1990). 
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the PPD impacts their willingness to adjust the financial statements, along with their 
satisfaction with the audit partner. 
Despite the growing popularity of studies in audit negotiation, little research has focused 
on the role and effects of the PPD in the negotiation process. Although auditors and their 
clients' management (usually the CFO) are the principal parties in auditor-client 
negotiation, the PPD can become involved (Gibbins et al., 2007; McCracken et al., 2008) 
in a variety of ways. Furthermore, the model of audit negotiation (Gibbins et al., 2001) 
offers little insight into how the PPD can affect the auditor-client process. That is, given 
the PPD involvement, how does the communication of their involvement to the CFO 
affect the negotiation outcomes? Influence research suggests that including others in the 
situation can influence the outcome (Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Kipnis & 
Schmidt, 1982; Kipnis, Schmidt, Swaffin-Smith, & Wilkinson, 1984; Schriesheim & 
Hinkin, 1990; Yuki & Falbe, 1990). Multiple participants means a potential for 
differences in expertise, influence, and the degree to which negotiation participants 
perceive the auditor's and the client's interests to be aligned (Gibbins et al., 2001). 
Therefore, investigating the impact of this unique and important additional party to the 
audit negotiation will help expand and explain an important contextual feature of audit 
negotiations. 
Much of the audit negotiation literature to date focuses on the financial accounting 
impact of the negotiation, that is, the amount of adjustment to the financial statements 
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(Brown & Johnstone, 2009; Hatfield, Agoglia, & Sanchez, 2008; Jamal & Tan, 2010; 
Trotman, Wright, & Wright, 2005; Trotman, Wright, & Wright, 2009). Although this 
financial impact is certainly important, it is not the only outcome of the negotiation. The 
rel~tionship between the two parties is also affected (Gibbins et al., 2001; Greenhalgh, 
1987; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998; McCracken et al., 2008; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). 
Underlying the substantive negotiation there is a 'shadow' negotiation, where the roles 
and relationships between the parties are defined (Kolb & Williams, 2000). The outcome 
of this simultaneous negotiation either enhances one's ability to advocate for one's 
interests or undermines the ability of the other side to do the same (Kolb, 2004), which in 
turn affects how the relationship works, the power of each negotiator and the financial 
outcome of the negotiation (McCracken et al., 2008; Salterio, 2012). Consequently, the 
strategy of communicating PPD involvement may impact not only the financial outcome, 
but also the relationship between the parties. This is important as audit negotiations take 
place within a continuing relationship, and audit firms actively manage these 
relationships (McCracken et al., 2008). They are not a 'one-off negotiation where the 
parties have no prior knowledge of one another. Auditors must therefore balance their 
duty to ensure financial statements are free of material misstatement while 
simultaneously fostering a functional working relationship. 
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Within this continuing relationship, the CFOs have developed preferences for the type of 
relationship they want with their auditor (McCracken et al., 2008). 4 McCracken et al. 
(2008) explore these relationships, and subsequently the roles auditors are positioned into 
as a result of these preferences. The CFOs' preference can be for a more proactive or 
reactive relationship with their auditor. By defining what kind of relationship they want, 
they also are defining a set of actions that would be consistent within that relationship, 
and thus an auditor role type is developed. Relationships, and the roles parties play, have 
a real effect on how the negotiation takes place as well as its outcome (Beattie et al., 
2004; McCracken et al., 2008). This CFO preference for auditor-type may be very 
important as audit firms want to maintain a good relationship with their client to help 
ensure they maintain the firm as a client and avoid having the audit put out to tender. 
This study incorporates this key variable and investigates how a CFO's preference for an 
auditor type and actual auditor-type impact both the financial result of the negotiation and 
the auditor-client relationship. 
Based on results of prior research and recent changes in legislation and accounting 
standards, the need to explore the role of PPDs in the negotiation process is now more 
important than ever. Research suggests that the communication of the PPD involvement 
is a strategic choice of the audit partner (Gibbins et al., 2005). Thus, my primary 
objective is to investigate the financial and relationship impact of various strategies of 
communicating PPD involvement. This involvement encompasses two decisions by the 
4 This paper will use the term 'type' as the term 'role' is used differently in traditional negotiation literature 
to denote the various parties in a negotiation, such as buyer/seller, union/management. 
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audit partner. The first is the decision of whether or not to communicate the involvement 
of this additional party into the negotiation. The second is the decision of how to 
communicate the PPD's involvement, as both negotiation and influence literature suggest 
that there are differences in how parties are communicated (Goldman, Crapanzano, Stein, 
& Benson, 2008; Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Kipnis, Schmidt, Swaffin-Smith, 
& Wilkinson, 1984). Since audit negotiations take place within on-going relationships, 
it is important to incorporate other key audit-specific characteristics such as the CFO's 
preference for an auditor-type, and the actual auditor-type. My experimental, case based 
study incorporates these three key variables, two manipulated (influe·nce tactic to 
communicate the PPD involvement and auditor-type), and one measured (CFO 
preference for auditor-type) and investigates their effect on both the financial outcome 
(adjustment to the financial statements) and the relationship outcome (satisfaction with 
the audit partner) of the negotiation. 
This study contributes to the literature in three major ways. First, I combine literature 
from organizational behavior and psychology in order to introduce the "influence" 
concept to audit negotiations and explore the role of PPDs in negotiations. Previous 
studies of audit negotiations have studied various negotiation strategies such as bid 
high/concede later, trading off issues, concessionary strategies, compromising tactics, 
contending tactics, and reciprocity strategies (Bame-Aldred & Kida, 2007; Brown & 
Johnstone, 2009; Gibbins, McCracken, & Salterio, 2010; Hatfield et al., 2008; Sanchez, 
Agoglia, & Hatfield, 2007; Trotman et al., 2005). Such strategies and tactics have been 
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found to be important and influence the financial outcome of the negotiation (Beattie et 
al., 2004). This is the first study, of which I am aware, that investigates influence tactics 
involving a key supporting party and tests their effectiveness on negotiation outcomes. 
This also allows for a better understanding of how previous research fits into the current 
reporting environment and how future studies could build upon the notion of influence to 
empirically test these and other social relationships within audit negotiations. Thus, 
exploring influence tactics within continuing auditor client relationships is an important 
extension to audit negotiation research. 
Second, I explore an addit.ional aspect of the negotiation outcome, a measure of 
relationship quality: client satisfaction. The different outcomes of an accounting 
negotiation include the contents of the client's financial statements, the auditor's opinion 
on the statements, whether or not the auditor is reappointed and the relationship between 
the audit partner and CFO (Gibbins et al., 2001; McCracken et al., 2008). Much of the 
audit negotiation research focuses on the final adjustment to the financial statements. 
This is of clear importance, as this has a direct impact on the quality of the financial 
reports. However, the continuing relationship between the audit partner and the CFO is 
also extremely important (McCracken et al., 2008) and relationship quality has been 
shown to influence subsequent negotiation outcomes (Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998; 
McCracken et al., 2008; Weiss, 1993) but has received little attention in empirical audit 
negotiation research to date. Only a handful of audit negotiation studies have looked at 
outcomes other than the financial statement adjustment, such as client satisfaction 
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(Perreault & Kida, 2011; Sanchez et al., 2007) or affect (Perreault & Kida, 201 \). This 
study answers a call in accounting for negotiation research to incorporate interpersonal 
relationships into the research (Bame-Aldred & Kida, 2007). 
Third, I provide practical implications of involving the PPD in the negotiation. With a 
better understanding of how the PPD affects the negotiation process, partners can more 
effectively manage their relationship with the client while also ensuring high quality 
financial reporting. This answers a call for negotiation research to investigate how one 
negotiation party reacts to the tactics used by the other party (Bame-Aldred & Kida, 
2007). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of 
the auditor-client negotiation literature and describes the current audit negotiation 
models. I review the literature about the PPD and show how the PPD fits into the audit 
negotiation model. I also review the limited research discussing CFO preference for 
auditor roles and auditor-type. I then introduce the notion of influence and show how this 
concept can be applied to strategic communication of PPD involvement in audit 
negotiations. In Chapter 3 I propose how the PPD's involvement, CFO's auditor 
preference, and auditor-type impacts both the financial and relationship outcomes of the 
negotiation. I propose that depending on the nature of the current relationship, different 
strategies should be used to disclose the PPD's involvement. In Chapter 4, I discuss the 
results of the experiment, and Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of results, the 
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study's implications, and its contribution to our understanding of auditor-client 
negotiations. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
Although research on negotiation is an established discipline, auditor-client negotiation is 
a relatively new stream of academic research. In 1991, Antle and Nalebuff proposed an 
analytical modeling paper of auditor-client negations; however little academic research 
followed their paper. By 2005, a set of foundational papers were published in the area of 
auditor-client negotiation (Beattie, Fearnley, & Brandt, 2000; Beattie, Fearnley, & 
Brandt, 2001; Beattie et al., 2004; Gibbins et al., 2001; Gibbins et al., 2005) which then 
spawned this new area of research. The typical v.iew of the auditor-client interaction 
prior to this time was that of management (the CFO) giving the company's financial 
statements to the auditor; and of the auditor then issuing a report on the financial 
statements, usually a clean (unqualified) report (Salterio, 2012). Financial statements 
were viewed as the representations of management, rather than a joint product, the result 
of a negotiation between the auditor and the client (Antle & Nalebuff, 1991). Antle and 
Nalebuff (1991) recognized this and proposed an analytical model referenced in much of 
the auditor-client negotiation literature to come. The authors outlined their thinking in 
the first paragraph of their paper (Antle & Nalebuff, 1991) as follows: 
Under Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, the literal claim is that financial 
statements are the representations of management. Our view of the auditing 
process, however, focuses on its negotiated character. Financial statements 
should be read as a joint statement from the auditor and manager. The statement 
becomes a joint venture ifthe auditor is unwilling to provide an unqualified 
opinion on management's stated representations. At that point, the auditor and 
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client begin negotiations in which the auditor may offer a revised statement. ... 
In the end, compromises are usually found, statements are revised, and the auditor 
issues an unqualified opinion on the revised statements." (p. 31) 
With increasing research focused on this 'negotiation' between auditors and their clients, 
the academy came to recognize that auditor-client negotiations were a real phenomenon 
in auditing practice, and therefore worth researching (Salterio, 2012). With the 
acceptance that negotiations took place in practice, critical examination of the 
phenomenon was needed and the stream of audit negotiations became increasingly 
popular. 
In this section, I will first explore the foundational papers that helped establish the stream 
of auditor client negotiation. This includes the Gibbins et al. (2001) model, and 
subsequent research by Gibbins et al. (2005; 2007) which help substantiate the model, as 
well as the work by Beattie et al. which emerged at almost the same time (Beattie et al., 
2000; Beattie et al., 2001; Beattie et al., 2004). Second, I will discuss the role of the PPD 
and their importance in audit negotiations. Third, I will discuss influence tactics and how 
they relate to involving the PPD into audit negotiations. Lastly, I will discuss auditor-
client relationships and auditor-types and their importance to audit negotiations. 
Recognizing that two literature reviews on auditor client negotiation have been published 
recently (see Salterio (2012) and Brown & Wright (2008)), I will highlight key findings 
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from this literature, discuss where my paper fits in, and then incorporate other streams of 
literature which relate to my paper. 
2.1 Auditor-Client Negotiation Models 
Drawing upon the basic premise put forward by Antle & Nalebuff (1991) toward auditor-
client negotiations, Gibbins et al. (2001) develop a descriptive audit specific model of 
negotiation based on a model of basic negotiations (Kennedy, 1992; Pruitt & Carnevale, 
1993). The auditor-client negotiation model (see Figure 1) is rooted in the psychology of 
negotiation literature and is also grounded in the auditing context. Building on the 
understanding that context is essential to accounting research in general (Libby & Luft, 
1993), and to audit negotiation in particular (Beattie et al., 2000; Beattie et al., 2001; 
Kleinman & Palm on, 2000), Gibbins et al. (2001) adapt the model to the unique 
characteristics found in the auditing context, from an auditor's perspective. The model 
specifies contextual features found in the accounting literature, as well as factors 
suggested by senior practitioners in interviews that are likely to be important to auditor-
client negotiations. These contextual features can influence the process elements, which 
in turn, can influence the prominence of the some of the contextual features (Salterio, 
2012). 
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Figure 1: Model of Auditor Client Negotiation 
Reproduced from Gibbins et al. (2001) 
Auditor 
-client 
history 
r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
I 
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-----------------------------~ 
FIG. 1.-The accounting adaptation of rhe basic negotiation setting and categories of 
accounting conrextual features. 
The initial GSW model in Gibbins et al. (2001), which was revisited by Salterio (2012) is 
based on some core assumptions about the auditor/client audit negotiation context. First, 
there is a need for an unqualified audit report for stock exchange listings and there is an 
overarching joint interest between the auditor and the client which motivates them to 
resolve differences. Next, the auditor and the client usually have a past history of 
contentious or cordial relationships which frame the current and future negotiations. 
Because of GAAP constraints, sometimes there is no flexibility around an issue (forced 
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choice); other times there can be opportunities to split the difference or find alternate 
acceptable solutions. However, there are costs of acquiring and using information. As 
there is usually an ongoing relationship between the auditor and client, there are 
consequences to the relationship and future interactions that can impact how the current 
negotiation is handled. 5 There can also be legal consequences, litigation and the 
potential for discipline from third parties as auditors are required to comply with GAAP, 
GAAS and other constraints placed by third parties. Lastly, the audit partner is interested 
in both the results for himself, but also for the client as not meeting the client's wishes 
impacts their future relationship. 
The auditor client negotiation takes place within an audit context. The audit contextual 
features are grouped into three categories specified in the model: external, interpersonal 
and capabilities (Gibbins et al., 2001; Gibbins et al., 2005; Salterio, 2012). External 
conditions are factors not under control of either party, such as GAAP, GAAS, deadlines 
and statutory requirements. The interpersonal group contains such factors such as the 
roles of key players in both organizations and their desires about how to develop and 
manage relationships, as well as risk preferences. Capabilities include the party's 
expertise, knowledge and skills, and the other party's perception of those skills. As a 
group of experts within the firm, the PPD can assist the audit partner with technical 
expertise, and as such is situated in this aspect of the model (Gibbins et al., 2001). 
5 Although Rule 204 requires mandatory audit partner rotation on reporting issuers with market 
capitalization and total assets greater than 10 million (ICAO 2009), this rotation is after a seven year 
relationship has existed. Furthermore, ifnot a reporting issuer, the relationship can be substantially longer 
as no mandatory rotation requirements exist. 
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To help substantiate the contextualized model, Gibbins et al. (2001) develop a 
questionnaire to provide initial descriptive evidence about negotiation by the external 
auditor with the client. Ninety three experienced Big 5 (plus one international audit firm) 
audit partners with significant experience participated in the study. Results show that 
67% of partners experience negotiations with 50% or more of their clients, and all 
partners had reported experiencing a negotiation with some clients, suggesting 
negotiations indeed do take place over the financial statements and they are a normal part 
of client service. The field questionnaire results are broadly consistent with the model, 
and thus help corroborate that the contextual features identified in the model in Figure 1 
do indeed impact audit negotiations. Furthermore, the negotiation issues are complex and 
take much time and involve several people, including the PPD. The auditor's expertise 
was found to be central to accounting negotiation. Partners indicated the accounting 
negotiation is distributive and thus win/loss outcomes are expected more so than 
integrative solutions, which is consistent with much of the general behavioral negotiation 
literature (Neale & Bazerman, 1991 ). Two factors highlighted as very important to the 
negotiation were 'accounting and disclosure standards' and 'audit firms accounting 
expertise', of which the PPD is a part of. Furthermore, accounting negotiations can affect 
the financial statements materially and when such negotiations occur, they are important 
to the parties involved. Overall, results suggest that accounting negotiation is important, 
frequent and context-sensitive (Gibbins et al., 2001). 
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Building on their previous paper, Gibbins, McCracken Salterio (GMS) (2005; 2007) 
explore the GSW model from the CFO perspective to ensure the auditor-client 
negotiation model indeed represents both sides. Having both parties recall the 
negotiation similarly provides additional assurance that the recalls are a reliable 
characterization of the process. To do this, the authors compare common item "recalls" 
collected in the two field questionnaires by the two sides participating in the negotiations 
- audit partners and chief financial officers (CFOs). Overall the authors find largely 
congruent recalls. The results show a high level of congruency across CFOs and audit 
partners in the type of issues negotiated, parties involved in resolving the issue and the 
elements making up the negotiation process, including agreement on the relative 
importance of various common accounting contextual features. The analysis of the 
common accounting contextual features suggested that certain features were consistently 
important across large numbers of negotiations, whether viewed from the audit partner's 
or the CFO's perspective. Both sides agreed that accounting standards and expertise 
were central to the negotiation, and both saw the audit committee as almost entirely 
peripheral. The authors found that both audit partners and CFOs saw negotiation more as 
a distributive process. Therefore, each tries to persuade the other party to adopt their 
position or agree on a position between the two initial positions. Although much of the 
contemporary literature on negotiation espouses the benefits of integrative bargaining and 
finding new solutions, neither party in auditor-client negotiations appears to view the 
process in this way. Overall, audit partners and CFOs appeared to use a similar mental 
model of negotiations (Gibbins et al., 2005). 
16 
Although there was a substantially similar view of the negotiation overall, there were 
differences in how each party viewed some elements and features of the auditor-client 
negotiation model. One such difference is that audit partners emphasized prior 
negotiations' importance to the present negotiation more so than CFOs did. Audit 
partners also reported more involvement of the technical team, reporting their 
involvement 100% of the time whereas CFOs only reported knowing their involvement 
50% of the time. Another interesting difference highlighted in the study was in terms of 
the number of issues viewed as part of the negotiation. CFOs viewed negotiations as a 
one off, thus dealing with one issue at a time, whereas audit partners were found to be 
aware of a list of potential issues to be negotiated. CFOs thought not only that they had 
more accounting expertise than the audit partners did, but that they also understood the 
business better (Gibbins et al., 2005). 
GMS also authored a second paper (2007) based on the above CFO questionnaire; this 
time focusing on the additional questions posed to CFOs which did not have a 
comparison to audit-partner responses. The results show that CFOs saw negotiation with 
the auditors as a consequence of a change in: 1) accounting and disclosure standards; 2) 
personnel influential in the organizations financial reporting or; 3) business changes (new 
business deals or acquisitions). The CFO felt that the negotiation was thrust upon them, 
and they then had to manage it. The CFOs informed other management (such as the 
CEO) and were aware of their preferences, but did not seek their help. However, 
informing the Board or the audit committee was much less frequent, though when the 
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committee was consulted, the more independent the audit committee was, the more likely 
a new potentially win-win solution was to arise. CFOs were not particularly motivated to 
search for win-win solutions; rather they saw the negotiation as win-lose, and focused on 
form more than substance in resolving the issue. The CFO felt that issues were complex, 
requiring research and analysis, and dependent on knowledge and expertise, rather than 
interpersonal bargaining tactics or relative negotiation skill (Gibbins et al., 2007) 
At the same time as the literature was emerging from Gibbins et al. in Canada, an 
independent research program studying the same phenomenon was underway in the 
United Kingdom. An article was published in 2000 (Beattie et al.) and then a book titled: 
Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About (Beattie et al., 2001 ). ~hese 
showed a similar portrait of auditor-client negotiations, a process deeply contextualized 
within the auditing environment. Subsequently, the book was summarized into a paper to 
make it accessible through the scholarly journal literature (Beattie et al., 2004). The 
authors develop a model of auditor-client negotiations through surveys and interviews of 
auditor and CFO pairs in the UK. The model, although unique to that portrayed in 
Gibbins et al. (2001 ), largely proposes similar contextual dependent intera~tions. 
The basic question the authors were trying to answer in this study was, "How do 
companies and their auditors resolve important audit issues?" (Beattie et al., 2004). In 
this study, the authors engaged in in-depth interviews with the matched audit partners and 
finance directors of a varied group of six-major UK listed companies (recently engaged 
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in significant negotiations). As a result, they developed a grounded theory model of the 
negotiation process and the factors that influence the nature of the outcome of 
interactions. The authors note that although general theories of negotiation, such as 
Gulliver's framework (1979) may have some applicability to the audit setting, there are 
important specific factors associated with the audit context that limit the use of generic 
models. At the time this was the only behavioral study to adopt a qualitative, case study 
based approach using real audit negotiations. 
The model shows that negotiation is a process involving events, strategies, outcome and 
consequences. The nature of the interaction is influenced by the specific context of the 
interactions, that is, the issue, objectives of the individual parties, key third parties and 
other factors. General contextual factors such as quality of the primary relationship, 
company circumstances, audit firm circumstances, and company buyer type is also found 
to impact the negotiation. The external economic and regulatory setting has a significant 
but more periphe~al impact. The quality of the primary relationship affects both the 
quality of the outcome and the ease of agreement (Beattie et al., 2004). In the case of 
significant accounting issues (and where the main parties are unable to agree) third 
parties such as the audit firm's technical department and audit committees can be 
influential in the final outcome. This indicates that, at the negotiation stage, interactions 
involve multiple parties (Beattie et al., 2000). Other than highlighting the importance of 
other key players, such as the PPD in the negotiation process, some key factors pertinent 
to my study that were discussed in Beattie et al. (2004) with respect to influence 
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strategies and roles and relationships will be discussed separately under those headings in 
this section. 
2.2 The Professional Practice Department 
The PPD is a separate organizational department in all of the largest auditing firms. The 
PPD was created to help practitioners deal with the explosion of standards created by the 
profession to keep pace with innovations in business. As businesses increased in 
complexity, accounting standards followed suit with a proliferation of standards and 
pronouncements. Accounting firms responded to the increased complexity by creating 
these departments to assist partners in researching difficult accounting issues (Danos & 
Boley, 1980). As Danos & Boley state (1980, p 10), "It is difficult to expect practitioners 
with full-time client responsibilities to have the time or the expertise to research all 
questions which arise." The PPD's role is described by Salterio & Denham (1997) as an 
organizational unit of public accounting firms whose role is to assist partners iri making 
difficult judgments relating to the financial statements of an audit client (Danos & Boley, 
1980; Salterio, 1994). 6 The PPD provides an opinion on how issues should be resolved. 7 
The PPD is differentiated from the central research unit whose role is to provide potential 
precedents for practice office partners from databases maintained by the firm for that 
6 The Professional Practice Department is termed Accounting Consultation Unit in the Salterio & Denham 
(1997) paper. 
7 All of the Big 4 accounting firms' PPD's opinion is "final" and partners cannot overrule them (McNamee, 
Borrus, & Palmeri, 2002). Deloitte & Touche's Integrity & Quality Report (2002 p. 2) states, "Once a 
conclusion is reached, it is the final Deloitte & Touche conclusion - no partner may depart from it." 
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purpose (Salterio, 1994). Furthermore, central research units typically do not take 
responsibility for the ultimate resolution of an accounting problem in terms of its effect 
on a client's financial statements (Danos & Boley, 1980). 
The PPD can assist in making judgments when there exists a) a choice in current 
accounting policy standards or no standard exists, b) measurement and/or valuation 
alternatives or c) disclosure requirements (Salterio & Denham, 1997). The PPD can 
become involved in an issue at any time (Danos, Eichenseher, & Holt, 1989; Salterio & 
Denham, 1997) during the accounting cycle or audit. Some firms encourage early 
identification to help avoid problematic issues in the later stages (Salterio & Denham, 
1997), however this is not always the case in practice (McCracken et al., 2008). The PPD 
is a source of knowledge on technical accounting issues and as such, plays an important 
role in resolving the more difficult accounting issues in audit practice (Danos et al., 1989; 
Gibbins et al., 2001; McCracken et al., 2008). The PPD forms a part of the overall audit 
firm's accounting expertise, which is a very important contextual feature of accounting 
negotiations (Gibbins et al., 2001; Gibbins et al., 2005; Gibbins et al., 2007). Schultz and 
Reckers (1981) showed that PPD-like advice affected audit partner judgments on 
accounting disclosures and resulted in more well-reasoned positions. Ng & Shankar 
(2010) study the PPD from the auditor's point ofreference as well. They find that when 
there is a quality assessment standard ~nd the PPD explicitly recommends a preferred 
accounting treatment, the auditor is less likely to agree with the client's suggested 
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accounting method. They find no significant effect of the PPD when an explicit 
recommendation is not present. 
Although a few studies have looked at the impact of the PPD on the auditor side, no 
negotiation study has focused on PPDs' involvement on the CFO side as the main focus 
of study. One study that touched upon the concept of involving technical expertise of the 
auditing firm in auditor-client negotiations is Perreault and Kida (2011 ). The authors 
plan an experiment with various specific persuasive arguments that are unique to the 
auditing context. The participant breakdown in this study is: 11 % non-management; 30 
% managerial level positions such as project manager; 39% professionals from a number 
of industries (such as information technology/engineering-46%, financial services-27% 
and healthcare-25%) and the remaining 20% have the title of CEO, CFO or President. 
The arguments investigated were threats to qual~fy the audit opinion, warning/threats of a 
quality review, providing the opinion of a technical expert and providing the conduct of 
other companies. In addition to these arguments, they also manipulated the 
communication style. Communication style was manipulated in one of two ways, a 
cooperative style (using appreciative and respectful wording) or a contentious style 
(using wording that is very aggressive, such as telling the client they are wasting their 
time and telling them their position does not make sense). There is no control condition 
present so the authors could not determine how effective the arguments were compared to 
just asking the client to adjust, however they do compare the relative effectiveness of the 
arguments. The authors find that threatening to qualify the report and describing the 
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behavior of other companies elicited larger concessions than warning of the possibility of 
a quality control review. Providing the opinion of a technical expert was positioned 
above the quality control review, below the threat to qualify the report but not statistically 
different from either two arguments. The nature of the manipulation was overt rather 
than a more nuanced manipulation that may be more ecologically valid. One interesting 
finding from the report was the participants' perceived effectiveness of each argument. 
The authors find that providing the opinion of a technical expert was perceived to be the 
argument that would be the most persuasive. As the study employed more participants 
outside of the accounting/finance area (and outside the CFO role) than in it, it is not clear 
whether results extend to individuals who actively participate in the unique auditing 
environment who know the institutional setting and implications of their concessions on 
financial statements. 
In addition to this study, there have also been interesting findings with respect to the PPD 
involvement in the audit negotiation setting in general. Beattie et al. (2000) find that 
third parties in the negotiation process, such as the PPD, are influential in the final 
outcome, and that internal consultation by the audit engagement partners is high. They 
find that audit partners found that consultation helped support their view in discussions 
with clients, although company management did not appreciate their involvement late in 
the process. In Gibbins et al. (2001 ), the authors find accounting negotiations usually. 
involve several people and the audit firm's national office technical support plays an 
important role in negotiations. Furthermore, when the PPD becomes involved in a 
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negotiation, their involvement is considered quite important and has an impact on the 
negotiation (Beattie et al., 2000; Danos et al., 1989). In Gibbins et al. (2005), the authors 
find that technical partners are reported to be involved in the negotiation 100% of the 
time, whereas the clients report knowing of their involvement only 50% of the time. 
McCracken et al. (2008) build on this finding through their study of auditor-client dyads. 
They find the audit firm's PPD is involved deeply in almost all of the negotiations on the 
audit partner's side; however the audit partner does not always reveal their involvement 
to the client. This shows the PPD is involved in many of the most contentious issues, 
whether the client is aware or not. This lack of awareness of PPD involvement is 
interesting and suggests that auditors are making decisions behind the scenes on whether 
to inform the client of the PPD involvement. 
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2.3 Influence tactics 
Influence tactics are used to accomplish specific task objectives, such as getting the target 
person to carry out a task or support a proposed change (Yuki et al., 2005). These tactics 
are especially important when we want to understand how people effectively accomplish 
tasks that require the cooperation and assistance of other people both inside and outside 
the organization (Yuki et al., 2005). Influence tactics are examined by Kipnis et al. 
(1980) who develop a taxonomy of interpersonal influence processes and identify eight 
dimensions of influence. 8 Through further work, Kipnis & Schmidt (1982) modify the 
items and .scales and this modified typology of influence is used in later studies by the 
same authors (Kipnis et al., 1984; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988) and includes seven distinct 
influence tactics (see Table 1) : reason, coalition, ingratiation, exchange, assertiveness, 
higher authority, and sanctions. 9 This seminal study triggered substantially increased 
work in the area of influence (Higgins, Judge, & Ferris, 2003; Schriesheim & Hinkin, 
1990) and is sufficiently comprehensive and representative of the various frameworks 
proposed across different disciplines (Higgins et al., 2003; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2008); 
therefore I will use this typology as the basis for selecting and differentiating types of 
influence tactics. 10 
8 A related stream of research in social psychology is the study of social power, most notably by French & 
Raven (1959; Raven, 1965). Social power is distinguished from influence as the former refers to the 
potential and the latter to the actual use of power (Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998). It is the 
conversion of potential power into effective persuasive strength which is important (Beattie et al., 2004). 
9 Ingratiation was also referred to as "friendliness" and exchange as "bargaining" (Kipnis, Schmidt, 
Swaffin-Smith, & Wilkinson, 1984) 
10 In addition to the Kipnis et al. framework, there have been other frameworks as well as extensions and 
revisions to the frameworks such as Mowday ( 1978), Sch ii it and Locke ( 1982), Schriesheim & Hinkin 
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Table 1: List of Influence Tactics 
Reason - the use of facts and data to support the development of a 
logical argument 
Coalition - the mobilization of other people in the organization 
Ingratiation - the use of impression management, flattery and the 
creation of goodwill 
Exchange - the use of negotiation through the exchange of benefits or 
favours 
Assertiveness - the use of a direct and forceful approach 
Higher Authority -gaining the support of higher levels in the organization to 
back up requests 
Sanctions - the use of organizationally derived rewards and 
punishments 
Influence tactics have been studied under various names in a few studies within the 
auditor-client negotiation research. Beattie et al. (2004) use the above mentioned Kipnis 
et al. (1980; 1984) taxonomy and find the influence tactic used affected the outcome of 
the negotiation. Assertiveness, reasoning, coalition and sanction strategies were 
associated with "good outcomes" while ingratiation was associated with poor outcomes, 
and the use of bargaining and higher authority was associated with outcomes of varying 
quality (Beattie et al., 2004). 11 Perreault & Kida (2011) find the threat tactic (threatening 
to qualify the audit report) significantly affected the concessions a client made. Threat 
(1990), Yuki & Falbe (1990) and Yuki et al. (2005). There does not appear to be a consensus within the 
literature on which framework is definitively the most appropriate, however, the Kipnis et al. framework 
appears to be the most used and dominant framework within the literature. Furthermore, as I am only 
looking at a subsample of the tactics, no other frameworks offer an additional influence tactic of bringing in 
additional parties to the negotiation. 
11 A "good outcome" means that the quality of the financial reporting outcome reflects 'good' accounting 
from a public interest perspective (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 11) 
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tactics would fit into the 'sanctions' category in the Kipnis et al. (1984) framework and 
may represent the most extreme form of sanction available to auditors (Beattie et al., 
2004). Not surprisingly, threats have been found to engender negative attitudes and can 
harm the relationship between the parties (Tedeschi, 1977). Consistent with these results, 
Perreault & Kida (2011) find that these threats to qualify the audit report, as well as 
threats to send the file to the quality control department for review both resulted in the 
least amount of positive affect toward the auditor. Ng & Tan (2007) show strategic 
communication of client preferences affect auditor's decisions about requiring 
adjustments to the financial statements. 
Other accounting studies have shown that influence techniques can influence auditor 
judgment. Robertson (2010) finds that ingratiation attempts can influence auditors' 
judgments under certain circumstances. Messier et al. (2012) find that ingratiation 
marginally increases auditor trust toward the client when the client has previously taken 
an incentive-inconsistent action (agreed to an audit adjustment). Sanchez et al. (2007) 
find the reciprocity strategy of conceding immaterial matters (similar to exchange), 
increases a client's perceived willingness to accept proposed material audit adjustments 
and results in greater satisfaction with the auditor and a higher likelihood of retaining the 
auditor. Creating a compromising atmosphere by ope~ly waiving adjustments compels 
others to reciprocate (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998; Putnam & Jones, 1982). Similarly, 
Messier et al. (2012) and Hatfield et al. (2008; 2010) also examine reciprocity in an 
audit-negotiation context. 
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There are seven influence tactics in the Kipnis et al. (1980, 1984) framework (as shown 
in Table 1), however only a subset of the tactics will be used in my paper in order to 
answer my specific research question. My study focuses on the effect of communicating 
involvement of the PPD to the CFO. Communicating the involvement of the PPD 
involves bringing in an additional party into the negotiation, thus, all tactics that involve 
additional parties are of interest to this study. There are two such influence tactics that 
entail bringing in additional parties; coalition and higher authority. A third tactic, reason, 
will also be discussed further, as this is the baseline condition in my study. 
Reason, coalition and higher authority have all been shown to be effective influence 
tactics in various studies, however this does not hold true for all studies. 12• 13 For 
coalition and higher authority, there are more mixed results than consistent results. 
Reason involves the use of facts and data to support the development of a logical 
argument (Kipnis et al., 1984) and has been found to be a common tactic to use when a 
person occupies a position of power on the basis of their skills and knowledge (Enns & 
Mcfarlin, 2003; Kipnis et al., 1984). It has been shown to be used in the accounting 
12 A successful outcome for most influence attempts is the target person's commitment to carry out the 
agent's request (Yuki, Seifert, & Chavez, 2008). Effectiveness has been measured in the influence studies 
in a number of ways (Falbe & Yuki, 1992), such as task commitment (Yuki & Tracey, 1992), overall 
performance of the influence agent (Yuki & Tracey, 1992), perceived effectiveness (Fu & Yuki, 2000), a 
dichotomous classification of successful/unsuccessful (Case, Dosier, Murkison, & Keys, 1988; Dosier, 
Case, & Keys, 1988; Schilit & Locke, 1982) and commitment/compliance/resistence (Falbe & Yuki, 1992) 
13 In some studies, "reason" has been termed "rational persuasion" (Yuki & Tracey, 1992; Yuki et al., 
2005; Yuki et al., 2008) and "higher authority" termed "upward appeal" (Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 
1980; Schriesheim & Hinkin, 1990; Yuki & Falbe, 1990) The terms are synonymous and the terms 
"reason" and "higher authority" will be used in this paper. 
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environment when there was not clear agreement (Beattie et al., 2001; Beattie et al., 
2004; Gibbins & Newton, 1994), and has been found to be consistently effective for 
proactive influence attempts (Yuki et al., 2005). Reason is a common influence tactic 
used in audit practice when an adjustment is suggested by the audit partner, as the partner 
would explain why they believe an adjustment is required. Coalition involves the 
mobilization of other people in the organization (Kipnis et al., 1984). Similarly, Yuki 
and Falbe ( 1990) define coalition tactics as "the person seeks the aid of others to 
persuade you to do something or uses the support of others as an argument for you to 
agree also", and it has been found to be a very effective influence tactic (Beattie et al., 
2004; Mechanic, 1962; Mowday, 1978; Strauss, 1962) in some settings. 14 Coalitions are 
used most often as a follow-up tactic after the target has already opposed a more direct 
influence attempt (Yukl & Falbe, 1990), such as reason. Higher authority involves 
gaining support of higher levels in the organization to back up requests (Kipnis et al., 
1984). Much of the research has found negative results for higher authority (Kipnis et al., 
1984; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988), whereas Beattie et al. (2004) found mixed results for 
higher authority. 
14 In later papers by Yuki and Tracey (1992) and Falbe and Yuki (1992), the authors condense coalition and 
higher authority as respondents failed to differentiate between them when rating downward and lateral 
influence attempts. However in the original paper, the authors find (similar to Kipnis and Schmidt) that the 
tactics are "sufficiently independent to be regarded as distinct forms of influence behavior" (Yuki & Falbe, 
1990, p. 133) Furthermore, in Falbe and Yuki (1992) the authors discuss a limitation in their findings for 
coalition because they likely only include only overt forms of coalitions (ie. higher authority), which 
"appeared coercive to the targets" ( 1992, p. 651 ). Furthermore, Schriesheim and Hinkin ( 1990) also find 
support for higher authority as a separate influence tactic. 
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Involving the PPD in a variety of ways is consistent with how they can become involved 
in audit negotiation in practice. Ng & Shankar (2010) investigate the effects of PPD 
involvement on the auditors' propensity to accept client-referred accounting methods. 
Their involvement of the PPD was either more as additional advice (coalition). or as an 
explicit recommendation (higher authority), and the authors note that through discussions 
with members of the PPD, they may follow either practice. Furthermore, Beattie et al. 
(2001; 2004) propose coalition and higher authority tactics in their model and find the 
audit partner engages the PPD in both ways through discussions with audit partners and 
CFOs. 
2.4 Relationships 
Much of the previous research on negotiation has focused on negotiations between 
unrelated parties with no prior knowledge of one another (Greenhalgh, 1987; Greenhalgh 
& Chapman, 1998; Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2010). The relationship between the 
parties was often deliberately eliminated by design so as to control for this variable 
(Greenhalgh, 1987). Greenhalgh (1987) began the movement to incorporate the . 
important relationship factor into research, which has since gained traction and can be 
found in many negotiation studies. Auditor-client negotiations take place within a 
continuing relationship. The relationship between the audit partner and the client is very 
important, and was cited by CFOs as one of the most important interpersonal factor 
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affecting the negotiation (Gibbins et al., 2005; Gibbins et al., 2007; Salterio, 2012). 15 In 
an audit context, the client and the audit partner can have a long relationship spanning 
several years and anticipate working together in the future and the general quality of the 
relationship affects the negotiations (Beattie et al., 2004; Gibbins et al., 2005). 16 Indeed, 
one aspect of focus in the accounting negotiation literature is that negotiations take place 
within a continuing relationship; negotiations are not a 'one off' between parties who will 
not see each other again. Furthermore, not only do they take place within a continuing 
relationship, past and current outcomes have consequences for future negotiations. 
Therefore, it is important to consider how this relationship is impacted when different 
influence tactics are used. Embedded in this relationship are certain expectations 
between the parties, that is, each party can advocate for a position within a role embedded 
in a relationship (Kolb, 2004). 
2.5 Auditor Type 
Kolb & Williams (2000) separate the substantive issues of the negotiation from the 
underlying parallel negotiation that takes place below the surface of the overt negotiation. 
In this 'shadow negotiation', the terms of the relationship, expectations and roles are 
brought out. It is through this framework of strategic moves that the negotiation unfolds 
15 Of the 23 common accounting contextual features, the relationship with the audit partner was the only 
feature rated significantly above the scales' midpoint (p=0.05 or lower) AND reported as "high or 
essential" by more than 50% of the respondents (Gibbins, McCracken, & Salterio, 2005). 
16 As noted previously, Rule 204 requires mandatory audit partner rotation on reporting issuers with market 
capitalization and total assets greater than 10 million (ICAO 2009), however, this rotation is after a seven 
year relationship has existed. Furthermore, if not a reporting issuer, the relationship can be substantially 
longer as no mandatory rotation requirements exist. 
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(Kolb, 2004). McCracken et al. (2008) use this framework to analyze the roles and 
relationships in CFO and audit partner dyads. The authors find that it is the CFO who 
positions the auditor in a role, and the quality of the relationship is affected by the 
appropriateness of the actions with respect to the roles. 17 Roles are also introduced in 
Beattie et al. (2004), though their identification of 'Audit Partner seller-types'. The term 
'role' accurately describes the phenomenon that McCracken et al. (2008) wanted to 
capture, that is of an individual playing a 'role', like an actor. However, because this 
term has strong semantic underpinnings in traditional negotiation literature, the term 
"type" will be used in this study (i.e. "auditor-type" versus "auditor-role"), consistent 
with Beattie et al. (2004). 
McCracken et al. (2008) focus on this dyadic relationship between audit partners and 
CFOs to better understand the negotiation process. In this paper the researchers analyze 
interviews in which pairs of CFOs and their audit partners describe their financial 
reporting relationship and discuss how they negotiated a specific issue. They find that 
the process is not linear, and the 'fluidity' of the process not only affects the financial 
issues in the negotiation, but also affects the 'negotiation roles' and relationships (termed 
the 'shadow negotiation'). The authors find that it is the CFO who determines the type of 
relationship (labelled proactive and reactive), thereby at the same time also positioning 
the auditor into a particular role and expecting them to act in a certain way to fulfill this 
role. Both McCracken et al. (2008) and Beattie et al. (2004) find that relationships, and 
17 In the McCracken et al. (2008) study, there is an equal split of CFO participants who prefer auditors as 
'police officers' and 'experts'. 
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the roles parties play, have a real effect on how the negotiation takes place as well as its 
outcome. 18 
McCracken et al. (2008) cite two main auditor-types, the 'expert-advisor' and 'police-
officer' based on their interviews with auditor-client dyads whereas Beattie et al. (2004) 
propose six 'seller types' in their paper, also based on interviews with auditor-client 
dyads. 19 Beattie et al. (2004) label and discuss the six seller types as follows: The 
'crusader' is the highest quality partner, one who exhibits an extremely high level of 
professional and personal integrity. They display both a social and professional 
conscience and are prepared to take their' responsibilities beyond their statutory duty if 
they feel that it is the right thing to do. The second type is coined the 'safe pair of hands'. 
This auditor type also displays a high level of professional integrity and they ensure their 
client's financial reporting complies not only with the letter of the regulatory framework, 
but also with the spirit. They will not compromise themselves in any way. The third 
type identified is the 'accommodator' who has a moderate level of integrity. This auditor 
type ensures their client's reporting complies with the letter of rules, but they are 
prepared, under certain circumstances to bend the rules and condone creative compliance 
or rather aggressive accounting treatments. The fourth auditor type is the 'trustor', who, 
when dealing with normally conservative clients adopt an attitude that is insufficiently 
18 In discussing the McCracken et al. (2008) paper, I use the term 'type' instead of 'role' to maintain 
consistency and avoid confusion. 
19 Jamal & Tan (2010) offer a different view of "auditor-type" and identify three types of auditors which 
are posited to correspond to profiles of auditors as discussed by standard-setters and regulators; the 
principles-oriented, rules-oriented and client-oriented auditor type. These auditor-types offer insights when 
studying research questions relating to rules versus principles debate, but do not relate to the current study. 
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critical and questioning and takes the company to be fireproof. Although their underlying 
professional integrity may be high, this trusting attitude overarches their professional 
skepticism and their role as an effective auditor. The fifth auditor type is the 
'incompetent' who lacks the necessary level of technical competence and the sixth is the 
'rogue' who has no sense of professional integrity and will knowingly flout the 
regulatory framework for personal gain if they think that they can get away with' it. It is 
noted that neither the 'Incompetent' nor the 'Rogue' were present in their study. 
Furthermore, Beattie et al. (2004) acknowledge that the seller types identified are not 
mutually exclusive and thus partners may display characteristics from multiple types. 20 
As such, the Beattie et al. (2004) auditor 'seller-types' are integrated and discussed with 
the McCracken et al. (2008) auditor-types. 
A 'proactive' relationship is described by McCracken et al. (2008) to be one where the 
CFO and audit partner work together throughout the year to try to deal with potentially 
contentious issues at an early date. The financial statements are viewed as a joint 
product, where the audit partner 'co-creates' them. The CFO values the audit partner's 
opinion and asks for advice on accounting and disclosure treatments. In this type of 
relationship, the goal is to have the financial statements 'right' and to have them be able 
to stand up to detailed scrutiny. This is not to say that there are not disagreements and 
negotiations, as two accountants can have different views on the same transaction 
(Deloitte & Touche, 2002; Gibbins & Mason, 1988); however, the focus is on trying to 
2
° Footnote 9 in (Beattie et al., 2004). 
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attain the 'best' financial reporting (Deloitte & Touche, 2002). For this relationship to be 
effective it is important for the CFO and the audit partner to be matched appropriately, 
that is, the audit partner works in a manner consistent with the actions expected by the 
CFO. For this to be true, McCracken et al. (2008) introduce the notion of the 'expert 
advisor' auditor-type. This 'expert advisor' auditor is similar to Beattie et al. 's (2004) 
'crusader' or 'safe pair of hands'. The term used in this paper for this auditor-type will 
be the "expert crusader". 
An audit partner playing the role of the expert crusader auditor-type "consistently 
promotes best practice accounting, objects to the CFO's desire for accounting that is in 
minimal compliance with GAAP, and pushes early adoption of preferred GAAP that will 
be mandatory in future periods" (McCracken et al., 2008, p. 375). These auditors ensure 
the financial statements are of high quality and beyond reproach. In the McCracken et al. 
(2008) study, all of the audit partners embraced this type (though not all played it with all 
of their clients) and all desired to be in this ideal proactive relationship. As described in 
Beattie et al. (2004), the 'Crusader' is the 'highest quality' audit partner, who exhibits an 
extremely high level of professional and personal integrity and they are prepared to take 
their responsibilities beyond their strict statutory duty if they feel that it is the correct 
thing to do. Similarly, the 'Safe Pair of Hands' displays a high level of personal integrity 
and takes actions to ensure that their clients' financial reporting complies with not only 
the 'rules' of the framework, but also the spirit. 
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At the opposite end of the spectrum is the 'reactive' relationship. "The themes that 
characterize this relationship type include: the company has a position on an accounting 
for the issue that is known by many senior managers and potentially by board members, 
the audit partner is not informed about the issue until after the transaction has taken place, 
and the accounting issues are almost always being dealt with after year-end or, if a formal 
quarterly review is done, at the time of the quarterly review" (McCracken et al., 2008, p. 
373). The focus here has shifted from best practice high quality financial statements to 
ensuring the CFO's version of the financial statements are GAAP compliant. For this 
relationship to be effective, there again needs to be an appropriate match between the 
CFO and the audit partner. In this 'reactive' relationship, the audit partner needs to fulfill 
the 'police-officer' auditor-type identified by McCracken et al. (2008), similar to the 
'accommodator' auditor-type identified by Beattie et al. (2004). 
Audit partners cast as a 'police-officer' type "ensure their clients' financial statements 
comply with the minimal technically correct GAAP rather than quality or appropriateness 
of the accounting disclosures" (McCracken et al., 2008, p. 381) - the police-officer 
ensures the minimal rules are followed. Police-officer type auditors ensure the financial 
statements are "GAAP-compliant in all material respects, but do not suggest or advocate 
a conceptually sounder approach or one that is consistent with most companies in the 
industry (the so-called 'best practice')" (McCracken et al., 2008, p. 374). In this auditor-
type, there is an emphasis on finding support for the CFO's preferred position. Similarly, 
the 'Accommodator' type (Beattie et al., 2004) complies with the letter of the rules, but 
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may condone creative compliance or rather aggressive treatment in order to be helpful to 
the client when possible. In this paper, the term "accommodating" auditor-type will be 
used. 
Each proactive and reactive relationship can be effective or not, and this rests with the 
meshing of the auditor's actions and the CFO expectations. McCracken et al. (2008) find 
that it is the partner's responsibility to be the 'relationship manager' and it is part of the 
audit partner's job to keep the CFO happy. This can also be looked at using role theory. 
According to role theory (Katz & Kahn, 1978), each focal person (audit partner) is 
presented with a set of role expectations. The expectations for these positions are 
prescribed by multiple role senders (i.e. clients, employees, peers). The role senders 
evaluate the effectiveness of the focal person on whether their behaviours are congruent 
with the roles sender's expectations (Tsui, 1984). Therefore, if the CFO has positioned 
their auditor into an 'accommodating' auditor-type, actions consistent with this type, such 
as finding support for CFO position or not pressuring for early adoption of standards 
would be seen as congruent with the CFO's expectations, and therefore would be 
perceived as effective by the CFO. However, those same auditor behaviours would not 
be congruent with the expectations of a CFO who has a preference for an 'expert 
crusader' auditor-type and would likely cause strain on the relationship, causing the 
auditor to be replaced (as described in McCracken (2008, p. 375)). However, although 
the CFO tries to position the auditor into their preferred 'expert crusader' or 
'accommodating' type, the audit partner may not be agreeable to this type and continue to 
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act in their own preferred type and thus a mismatch results (actual auditor-type is 
different than the CFO's preferred auditor-type). As discussed in McCracken et al 
(2008), this can result in the firm stepping in to maintain client retention by changing the 
engagement partner to match-up with the client's expectations. 
Regulators want high quality financial statements. Therefore, in an 'ideal' situation from 
the regulators and audit partner's view, all relationships would be proactive with the CFO 
and the audit partner coming together to ensure the financial statements are as high 
quality as possible. However, as discussed, this is not always the case. Therefore, it 
would be beneficial for audit partners to have tactics in place to help influence their CFO 
counterparts to accept recommendations that make the financial statements high quality 
without putting the relationship in jeopardy. As it stands, "Audit partners in reactive 
relationships have to carefully weigh the seriousness of the accounting issue against the 
damage a confrontation would have on the relationship with the CFO." (McCracken et 
al., 2008, p. 381). 
2.6 Literature Review Conclusions 
Previous auditing research has established that negotiations take place between the audit 
partner and the CFO within the auditing process. The review of prior literature indicates 
that this growing body of re.search has tested and refined various aspect of the audit 
negotiation model. However, testing all aspects of this audit-negotiation model has not 
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yet been accomplished. One aspect of the model identified as important, but not yet 
tested is incorporating key other parties such as the PPD. From these papers, we find that 
the PPD is consistently involved in audit negotiations on the auditor side, and they are 
found to be imp~rtant to the process. Although the PPD is involved frequently in the 
negotiation process on the auditor-side, their involvement may or may not be 
communicated to the client. Despite their involvement in the negotiation process, the 
influence of the PPD has not been empirically studied as a main topic in any study and 
therefore there is a missing link in how their involvement and their influence can impact 
the negotiations. 
Influence tactics have been shown to be important in persuading others to comply with 
requests; however, they also can have an impact on other factors, such as satisfaction 
with the resolution process. Through reviewing the various influence tactics in the 
literature, two influence tactics involve bringing in an additional party, coalition and 
higher authority. Both of these tactics have been found to be used in practice involving 
the PPD; however the relative effectiveness of either of these tactics has not been studied 
to date. Therefore, this study seeks to build on the previous studies by incorporating 
these important influence tactics into the study of audit negotiation and test their relative 
effectiveness. 
Investigating the effect of an influence tactic is important in the negotiation; however, 
looking at it in isolation does not bring in the richness of the auditing context, which is 
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important in auditor-client negotiations. This study incorporates McCracken et al. 's 
(2008) finding of CFO' s preference for an auditor-type being a critical aspect of audit 
negotiations. Each auditor-client negotiation is imbedded in a relationship, where there 
are existing auditor behavior expectations and preferences. I use this central theme to 
structure specific, pertinent hypotheses to test how influence tactics, CFO preferences of 
auditor-type, and actual auditor-type pairings impact not only CFO's willingness to 
adjust, but also their satisfaction with the process. This brings both important contextual 
features and influence tactic together to form a set of five specific hypothesis linked to 
the research conducted to date and reviewed in this section. 
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3.0 Hypotheses Development and Experimental Design 
3.1 Hypotheses Development 
Hypotheses will be developed and categorized into two categories: willingness to adjust 
financial statements (Hl-H3) and satisfaction with the audit partner (H4-H5). Table 2 at 
the end of this section summarizes these hypotheses. 
3.1.1 Hypotheses relating to adjustments of the financial statements 
As discussed above, it is the CFO who determines the type of relationship desired with 
their audit partner, and thus they are also thereby positioning the audit partner into a 
particular auditor-type, and expecting them to act in a certain way to fulfill their 
expectations. 21 As McCracken et al. (2008) describe, an auditor playing the expert-
crusader-type "consistently promotes best practice accounting, objects to the CFO's 
desire for accounting that is in minimal compliance with GAAP, and pushes early 
adoption of preferred GAAP that will be mandatory in future periods" (p. 3 75). When 
auditors have been positioned into this role (thus the CFO prefers this auditor-type, and 
desires their auditor to act in this way) they work together and the financial statements 
are viewed as a joint product, where the audit partner 'co-creates' them. The CFO values 
21 In practice, audit partners have the choice whether or not they act in accordance with the CFO's 
preferences and thus the matching of CFO preference and actual auditor-type does not always happen. 
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the audit partner's opinion and asks for advice on accounting and disclosure treatments 
(McCracken et al., 2008). Contrary to this is the CFO's preference for an 
'accommodating' auditor-type, where there is an emphasis on finding support for the 
CFO's preferred position and the financial statements are no longer seen as a joint project 
(McCracken et al., 2008). The CFO is not looking for advice nor receptive to the audit 
partner's opinion on how to make the financial statements.of a "higher quality". A quote 
from a CFO included in the McCracken paper sums up this role nicely, "Unless it's 
absolutely, fundamentally, qualifying material, then I won't change" (McCracken et al., 
2008, p. 373). 
When the CFO has a preference for an expert crusader auditor-type, the CFO is looking 
for high quality financial statements that are beyond reproach. Although he/she may 
have a difference of opinion with the auditor, effectively, they have positioned the auditor 
as the 'expert' and as such will be more willing to adjust the financial statements, 
regardless of which tactic the auditor uses, or which auditor-type they have been matched 
with. Therefore, I expect CFOs who have an 'expert crusader' auditor-type preference to 
be more willing to adjust the financial statements than will those with an 
'accommodating' auditor-type preference. As such, hypothesis 1 is formally stated as: 
Hl: CFOs who prefer an expert crusader auditor type will be more willing to adjust the 
financial statements than CFOs who prefer an accommodating auditor type. 
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No specific hypothesis will be made regarding the impact of actual auditor-type assigned 
on the CFOs' willingness to post the adjustment as there is no theoretical basis to support 
a directional hypothesis for CFOs' willingness to post. Exploratory results of the auditor-
type will be discussed in the discussion section. 
Over and above the difference due to the CFOs' preference for auditor-type, I expect that 
the influence tactic used to communicate the PPD will also result in differences in the 
CFOs' willingness to adjust. The choice of influence tactic is important, as the use of an 
unacceptable influence tactic may result in a negative affective reaction by the target 
person, and therefore undermine the effectiveness of the behavior (Fu & Yuki, 2000). 
Although there are seven distinct influence tactics, as discussed above, I focus on a subset 
of tactics that involve ways of communicating the involvement of an additional party. Of 
the seven influence tactics, two tactics entail additional parties: coalition and higher 
authority. Lastly, I use the influence tactic of reason (as a base-line condition, and jointly 
alongside the other two tactics), as the underlying assumption in the literature is that, 
"most agents will prefer to use tactics that are socially acceptable, that are feasible in 
terms of the agent's position and personal power in relation to the target, that are not 
costly (in terms of time, effort, loss of resources, or alienation of the target), and that are 
likely to be effective for a particular objective given the anticipated l~vel of resistance by 
the target" (Yuki & Tracey, 1992, p. 526). Therefore reason will be used as the influence 
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tactic when the PPD has been involved in the discussion with the audit partner, but their 
involvement has not been communicated to the client. 
Reason "involves the use of facts and data to support the development of a logical 
argument" (Kipnis et al., 1984) and is used as a starting point in most negotiations. 
Research on use of tactics alone and in combinations shows that rational persuasion 
(rea~on) was the most common tactic to be used when only one tactic was used, and was 
also the tactic selected most often for use in combination (Yuki, Falbe, & Youn, 1993); 
and would likely be the first choice for a partner trying to influence a client. When a. 
partner is trying to influence a client to change their financial statements, they would first 
use arguments to support their recommendation, in hopes that the client would agree and 
acquiesce. Furthermore, one would rather start with a tactic that is likely to accomplish 
an objective with the least effort and cost associated with it (Yuki et al., 1993). Therefore 
a partner would try rational persuasion first rather than opt for a more aggressive form of 
influence to start the negotiation. Additionally, Yuki et al. (1993) found that most 
managers prefer to use this direct influence tactic for most requests as they are reluctant 
to invest the time and effort required to enlist the help of other people unless it is clearly 
necessary to influence the target person. Therefore, reason will be used as the influence . 
tactic with the control group, where the PPD is involved behind the scene, but the client 
is unaware of any PPD involvement. Reason will also be used as the starting point in the 
other two conditions (coalition and higher authority) as it would not make sense for the 
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auditor to require an adjustment but then not give a reason to the CFO of why they 
require the adjustment. 
Coalition "involves the mobilization of other people in the organization" (Kipnis et al., 
1984). Similarly, Yukl & Falbe (1990) define coalition tactics as "the person seeks the 
aid of others to persuade you to do something or uses the support of others as an 
argument for you to agree also", and have found to be a very effective influence tactic 
(Mechanic, 1962; Mowday, 1978; Strauss, 1962). 22 Coalition, with respect to PPD 
involvement, is akin to presenting the client with your preferred accounting treatment, 
and then disclosing that you have met with the PPD and they agree with your 
recommendation. This influence tactic shows the client that it is not just "in your 
opinion", but rather others around you, your colleagues, also agree. Coalitions are used 
most often as a follow-up tactic after the target has already opposed a more direct 
influence attempt (Yukl & Falbe, 1990), such as reason. 
Higher authority "~nvolves gaining support of higher levels in the organization to back up 
requests" (Kipnis et al., 1984). In a typical organizational setting, this would entail 
enlisting the support of your boss and having them present or endorse your request. In an 
22 In later papers by Yuki & Tracey (1992) and Falbe & Yuki (1992), the authors condense the tactics of 
coalition and higher authority into one tactic, coalition. However in the original paper, the authors find 
(similar to Kipnis and Schmidt) that the tactics are "sufficiently independent to be regarded as distinct 
forms of influence behavior" (Yuki & Falbe, 1990, p. 133) Furthermore, in Falbe & Yuki (1992) the 
authors discuss a limitation in their findings for coalition because they likely only include overt forms of 
coalitions (i.e. higher authority), which "appeared coercive to the targets" (1992, p. 651). Yuki also uses 
both higher authority and coalition in some later papers looking at cross-cultural difference (Fu & Yuki, 
2000; Yuki, Fu, & McDonald, 2003), suggesting they are distinct influence tactics. 
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audit setting, this would entail revealing to the CFO that you have spoken to the PPD and 
then indicating that they have the final say. By involving the PPD in this way, the audit 
partner implicitly acknowledges that the PPD is a higher authority in the firm, and that 
the PPD in fact have the 'control' over the final decision and they cannot be overruled. 23 
In practice, each of the accounting firms has a policy detailing what their process is to 
deal with consultations and differences of opinion, and each of the Big Four has similar 
formal authority for decisions of their PPDs. As a result ofEnron's collapse, each of the 
Big Four firms has been subject to much scrutiny in recent years with respect to its 
consultation process. A Business Week article from 2002 states, 
Like the other Big Five accounting firms, Andersen employs a team of experts at 
headquarters and elsewhere to review and pass judgment on knotty accounting, 
auditing, and tax issues facing its local offices. But unlike other firms, Andersen 
allows regional partners-the frontline executives closest to the companies they 
audit-to overrule the experts, according to accounting pros at the Securities & 
Exchange Commission and elsewhere. (McNamee et al., 2002) 
In a Deloitte report also published in 2002, the firm acknowledges that, "Differences of 
opinion do occur, and we expect each professional to address them throughout the 
consultations process." Furthermore, they also state the authority of the PPD, "Once a 
23 This strategy is more aggressive than a coalition strategy but is less aggressive than an overt 'threat' 
strategy where an auditor would specifically threaten to qualify the audit report. 
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conclusion is reached, it is the final Deloitte & Touche conclusion - no partner may 
depart from it" (Deloitte & Touche, 2002, p. 2). Similar authority is given to the PPD of 
the other Big Four accounting firms (Deloitte & Touche, 2008; Ernst & Young, 2008; 
KPMG, 2008; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). 
Although the PPD may formally have the final say on issues brought to them, how their 
involvement is communicated (if at all) to the. client is at the partner's discretion. 24 The 
partner's choice of influence tactic will affect the process and outcome of current 
negotiation, which then affect future negotiations (Gibbins et al., 2001 ), as well as the 
relationship between the parties (McCracken et al., 2008). Therefore, it is important that 
the audit partner carefully consider influence tactics before showing all of their cards. 
Although in the management literature coalition and higher authority tactics have 
generally been found to be less effective than other influence tactics (Falbe & Yuki, 
1992; Yuki & Tracey, 1992), this may not hold in audit negotiations. For instance, 
Beattie et al. (2004) found coalition tactics to be associated with good outcomes, and 
mixed outcomes for higher authority tactics. This supports the finding from Falbe et al. 
(1992) that in difficult influence situations (such as an audit negotiation), using some of 
the 'less effective' tactics to supplement the core tactics can increase the likelihood of 
24 Ng & Shankar (2010) investigate the effects of the PPD on the audit-partner decisions and in footnote 5 ~ 
state, "Based on our discussions with the technical department staff of participating firms, in general, the 
technical department personnel provide their opinion on the accounting issue under consultation, and leave 
the final decision to the discretion of the audit engagement partner." As such, it is possible that either 
influence tactic, coalition or higher authority, could be used by audit partners. Furthermore, Ng & Shankar 
(2010, pg. 1745) state that the PPD (when dealing with various accounting methods) "frequently, but do not 
always explicitly recommend/suggest that the client should adopt the most appropriate accounting method" 
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gaining target commitment, and may prove to be more effective than reason alone. 
However, because of the mixed results in both the management and audit literature with 
respect to the influence tactic.of higher authority, no formal predictions will be made 
with respect to the effect of this specific influence tactic. 
Many of the effective influence techniques available to managers in a management 
context may not be appropriate for an audit partner in an auditing context. The coalition 
tactic is appropriate and could be a valuable tool for audit partners to have in their 
proverbial negotiation toolbox. Yukl & Falbe (1990, p. 135) proposed that coalition 
tactics would be used more often in upward and lateral influence attempts than in 
downward influen~e attempts, reasoning that managers usually have sufficient power and 
authority to influence subordinates without using coalitions, however, for influencing a 
peer over whom one has no authority, coalitions may be one of the most effective 
influence strategies. Coalitions are a gentler form of persuasion compared to higher 
authority (Erez, Rim, & Keider, 1986; Yukl & Tracey, 1992), and research has shown 
that although usually a less effective tactic, coalitions can be highly effective in certain 
situations, such as supporting changes, innovations and new projects (Kanter, 1983; 
Kotter, 1982) (as cited Yukl & Tracey, 1992). Coalitions can also help convey the 
message that a request is consistent with the opinions of others in the organization 
besides the partner (Fu & Yukl, 2000). Therefore, J expect the CFO is more likely to 
concede and adjust the financial statements when the auditor brings in the PPD as a 
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supportive colleague, regardless of auditor-type. As such, hypothesis 2 is formally stated 
as: 
H2: CFOs in the coalition condition will be more willing to adjust the financial 
statements than CFOs in the reason condition. 
In both coalition and higher authority tactics, there are two parties in agreement, in a 
situation of uncertainty. Although coalition generally has received some positive results, 
there have been mixed, and many negative reactions to higher authority tactics in the 
literature (Brennan, Miller, & Seltzer, 1993; Fu & Yukl, 2000), as this is a more 
aggressive tactic (Erez et al., 1986). Higher authority "involves gaining support of higher 
levels in the organization to back up requests" (Kipnis et al., 1984), and therefore the 
auditor may be able to enhance their negotiation stance by providing the authority of a 
higher level. It is not just in the opinion of one person, it is the opinion of many, and 
they are powerfully encouraging cooperation. In this way, 'higher authority' is much 
more aggressive than simply informing of an opinion of another person in the 
organization (coalition). As such, higher authority is a very aggressive tactic that may, or 
may not been seen in a positive light by their counterparts. Much of the negotiation 
research has found negative results for higher authority (Kipnis et al., 1984; Kipnis & 
Schmidt, 1988) , whereas Beattie et al. (2004) found mixed results for higher authority. 
Therefore, analyzing the situation closely and taking other factors into consideration may 
reveal detailed nuances not previously studied that become important in determining the 
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effectiveness of a tactic, and could help explain the mixed results found in Beattie et al. 
(2004). 
As McCracken et al. (2008) and Beattie et al. (2004) find, relationships, and the roles 
parties play, have a real effect on how the negotiation takes place as well as its outcome. 
McCracken et al. (2008) cite two main auditor-types, the 'expert-crusader' and the 
'accommodator'. The expert-crusader auditor type is a proactive, continuously advising 
and assertive auditor who is more vocal and persistent about every little detail. This 
auditor makes sure that every issue is addressed, and the addition of yet another 
aggressive tactic could cause the CFOs to rebel against the overly aggressive tactic, 
causing them to lower their willingness to work with the auditor and become more 
antagonistic themselves. Coercive tactics have been found to inhibit joint gain because 
their use will undermine cooperation (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Britton, 1979; Greenhalgh & 
Chapman, 1998). Overly assertive negotiators are often penalized by their counterparts 
and can cause animosity, broken relationships, damage to reputations, and other negative 
short and long-term consequences (Weiss, 2012). Similarly, Perreault & Kida (2011) 
find an auditor's communication style affected a party's willingness to make concessions, 
with contentious negotiators eliciting fewer concessions. Furthermore, people generally 
reciprocate the communications they receive, especially contentious ones (Brett et al., 
1998; Rubin, 1980). Therefore, it is likely that an assertive and aggressive auditor, 
combined with the most aggressive influence technique could produce counter-
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productive results and result in less willingness to adjust the financial statements. 25 
Comparing this situation to one with a less assertive, more laid back accommodator-type 
auditor who normally tries to accommodate the client's wishes, the communication of the 
PPD as the higher authority may result in the CFO taking the issue more seriously and 
being more persuaded by the advice provided by this strong additional party. Thus, the 
auditor himself is not assertive, he/she is just the communicating the decision of the PPD. 
As such, hypothesis 3 is formally stated as: 
H3: Within the higher authority influence tactic, auditor type will affect the CFO's 
willingness to adjust, such that the greatest willingness to adjust will occur with an 
accommodating auditor type and the least willingness to adjust will occur with an expert 
crusader auditor type. 
25 No formal hypothesis will be predicted for other interactions as mixed results and limited theory prevent 
any basis for making theoretically informed predictions. 
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3.1.2 Hypotheses relating to client satisfaction with the audit partner 
In addition to the effects on the financial statements, there are also important effects from 
auditor-client negotiation on the relationship between the two parties. As discussed 
above, there are various influence tactics that an auditor can use to persuade the CFO to 
adopt their preferred position. As the tactic increases in aggressiveness, the likelihood 
that harm is caused to the relationship increases. Not only will the tactics affect the 
financial outcome of the negotiation, they also affect the interpersonal interactions (Cable 
& Judge, 2003; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998) between the parties and thus the 
relationship. Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) find those in both high and low status jobs who 
use 'appeal to higher authority' and 'coalition' tactics to influence their superiors receive 
the lowest performance ratings. In studies involving multiple influence tactics where 
reason, coalition and/or higher authority are involved, reason is most frequently used and 
is found to be more effective in terms of task commitment and effectiveness ratings of the 
agent (Yuki & Tracey, 1992). In much of the social psychological literature, people who 
use forceful and demanding tactics are disliked (French & Raven, 1959). Although 
involving others can be seen as a more aggressive influence tactic, it has also been found 
that involving others is a way to avoid 'losing face' and can help to convey that the 
request or proposal is consistent with the desires and needs of others besides the agent 
(Fu & Yuki, 2000). As well, one must be attentive to the features of particular 
negotiation settings and the consultative audit-team oriented environment. Furthermore, 
in many influence studies, coalition and higher authority influence tactics were combined 
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into one category, and labeled "coalition". Thus some previous results labeled 
"coalition" may be more logically linked to the tactic of higher authority. So although 
coalition tactics have sometimes been linked to less favourable outcomes,' this is likely 
not true in the highly consultative audit environment, where bringing in additional 
members is more of an acceptable behavior and consistent with the norms of the industry. 
However, involving the PPD and communicating their involvement as a higher authority 
is considered an aggressive strategy, a hard tactic, which is more likely to place strain on 
the relationship (van Knippenberg & Steensma, 2003), and as such is expected to harm 
the relationship. As such, hypotheses 4 are formally stated as: 
H4a: CFOs in the coalition condition are not expected to be more or less satisfied with 
the performance of the audit partner than CFOs in the reason condition. 
H4b: CFOs in the higher authority condition will be less satisfied with the performance 
of the audit partner than CFOs in the coalition or reason conditions. 
Although aggressive negotiators are often penalized, understanding the expectations of 
others and acting in accordance with those expectations will impact satisfaction of the 
CFO. When exploring the effect on the working relationship between the parties, the 
concept of expectations takes precedence. The consistency with the CFO's prevailing 
expectations in the context will determine whether harm is caused in the relationship 
(Tsui, 1984; Yuki & Tracey, 1992; Yuki et al., 1993). For instance, a manager facing 
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aggressive pressuring influence tactics from his boss will react differently than that same 
manager under those same aggressive pressuring tactics from a subordinate (Falbe & 
Yukl, 1992). Individuals need to exercise influence in an appropriate way to gain 
acceptance and motivate others to implement their decisions (Cohen & Bradford, 1989). 
Conforming to social norms is important because the use of an unacceptable influence 
tactic may result in a negative affective reaction by the target person (Fu & Yukl, 2000). 
Simply put, ifthe auditor is acting consistent with the CFOs' preferred auditor-type, 
there should be no harm to the relationship, as the CFO would be satisfied with the way 
in which the audit partner has performed. Harm to the relationship can occur if the CFO 
is dissatisfied with the way in which the audit partner has handled the situation, that is, 
the auditor is acting outside of the preferred expectations and results in more aggressive 
actions (unacceptable influence tactics) than what is expected by the target. The key for 
audit partners would be to understand the expectations of the CFO and ensure their 
actions are consistent with them in order to avoid harm to the relationship as different 
tactics will have differing results depending on the nature of the relationship between the 
two parties (Sundie, Cialdini, Griskevicius, & Kenrick, 2006). 
Although the CFO has a preference on what type of auditor he would like to work with, 
that match does not always take place perfectly across all audit negotiation contexts. 
Within smaller firms, there may not be a large choice of partners with the appropriate 
expertise, and costs of switching firms can be substantial. Even within larger firms, 
although a preference might be towards a more accommodating auditor, perhaps a more 
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assertive, advising type auditor is hired. Also, new CFOs may not be able to "choose" 
their auditor, as the firm and/or their specific partner have been with the organization for 
a number of years, and switching may not be feasible or appropriate. As such, there are 
many instances in which the CFO preferred auditor-type is not aligned with the actual 
type of the auditor. This mismatch is not expected to harm the relationship unless the 
auditor is more aggressive than the role preferred. As such, hypothesis 5 is formally 
stated as: 
HS: CFO preferred auditor type, and type of auditor received will interact to affect the 
CFO's satisfaction such that the lowest satisfaction ratings will occur for CFOs who 
prefer accommodating-type auditors but are matched with expert crusader type auditors 
compared to the other pairings. 
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Table 2: Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses relating to financial statement adjustments 
HI CFOs who prefer an expert crusader auditor type will be more willing to adjust 
the financial statements than CFOs who prefer an accommodating auditor type. 
H2 CFOs in the coalition condition will be more willing to adjust the financial 
statements than CFOs in the reason condition. 
H3 Within the higher authority influence tactic, auditor type will affect the CFO's 
willingness to adjust, such that the greatest willingness to adjust will occur with 
an accommodating auditor type and the least willingness to adjust will occur with 
an expert crusader auditor type. 
Hypotheses relating to satisfaction with the audit partner 
H4a CFOs in the coalition condition are not expected to be more or less satisfied with 
the performance of the audit partner than CFOs in the reason condition. 
H4b CFOs in the higher authority condition will be less satisfied with the performance 
of the audit partner than CFOs in the coalition or reason conditions. 
H5 CFO preferred auditor type, and type of auditor received will interact to affect the 
CFO's satisfaction such that the lowest satisfaction ratings will occur for CFOs 
who prefer accommodating-type auditors but are matched with expert crusader 
type auditors compared to the other pairings. 
3.2 Experimental Design 
My study aims to investigate the effect of communicating PPD involvement, auditor-type 
and CFO auditor preference on outcomes of the negotiation. I employ a 2 (CFO's 
\ 
preference for auditor-type) *2 (auditor-type)* 3 (communication) full factorial 
experimental case design in order to test the hypotheses. 
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3.3 Participants 
The participants in my study are 169 CFOs, controllers and their equivalents who are 
members or contacts of FBI (Financial Executives International) - Canada, an all-industry 
professional association for senior financial executives.26 My contacts at FBI-Canada, 
the CFERF (Canadian Financial Executives Research Foundation) sponsored my study 
and sent an email invitation to participate to their members and contacts across Canada. 27 
All participation was anonymous and confidential: the request for participation was sent 
directly from FBI in a newsletter and no identifying information was collected. I 
received 276 clicks on the link and 169 participants completed the survey, resulting in a 
61 % click-through response rate. 28'29 Table 2 contains the participation breakdown. 
Participants were told that no identifying information would be collected and 
26 Data was collected in November/December 2010. 
27 A follow up email was also sent approximately one week after the first. 
28 170 participants fully completed the case; however one respondent was removed due to unreasonable 
answers given throughout the case. This one respondent failed all the manipulation checks and clicked on 
the same number throughout the survey. Two participants did not fully complete a couple of the questions 
in the last section about their personal experiences, however they provided full answers up to that point and 
are therefore included in the analysis. 
29 Similar to many studies using notifications in newsletters or other advertisements (Jamal & Tan, 2010; 
Pomeroy, 2010), it is difficult to calculate a true response rate as the number of people who saw the posting 
cannot be calculated. The survey link was sent to 5332 individuals asking for their participation, resulting 
in a 5.2% response rate based on those who activated the link. A low participation rate was expected as 
participants at high levels were being solicited to participate in the study, and perhaps not all participants 
who were sent the link were qualified to complete the study and therefore did not participate. For example, 
Kipnis & Schmidt (1988) had an overall response rate of7% for CEOs, Graham and Harvey's (2001) was 
8.8% for senior financial managers and Graham et al. (2005) study had an 8.4% response rate for an email 
survey of senior financial executives. Sanchez et al. (2007) had a mail-in response rate of 13 .5% and 
Gibbins et al. (2005; 2007) had an excellent mail-in response rate of 15.1 % and FEI (Canada) had 
explained this was the "the highest to date". 
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participation was anonymous. 30 The survey was conducted on line through the Qualtrics 
survey software package. Once the participants clicked on the survey link, they were 
randomly assigned to one of the treatment groups to mitigate uncontrolled influences 
across treatment conditions. 
As the internal validity of the study can be affected by the suitability of individual 
participants, the participants should be both knowledgeable and involved in the relevant 
practice. In audit negotiation, participants need to be at a very senior level, preferably 
CFOs or their equivalent, ideally having some experience with audit negotiations. 
Participants, based on job title are 86 CFOs (51 %), 43 Vice President/Directors of 
Finance (25%), 19 controllers (11%) and 9 President/CEO/CAOs (5%) and 12 other 
senior job titles. The average reported revenue is $1.1 billion with a median of $200 
million. The majority of the participants (77%) are male, most (97%) have a professional 
accounting designation, and 86% of them have greater than 15 years of business 
experience. 37% of the participants are employed at public companies, 25% at large 
private companies, 7% at non-traded subsidiaries of public companies and the remaining 
at other types of companies such as small and medium private companies. Participants 
took a median time of 24 minutes to complete the case 
30 On the very last page of the survey, the last question asked participants if they would like to receive a 
report_ on the outcome of the study. 98 participants (58%) voluntarily left their email address. 
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Table 3: Analysis of Participants 
Clicked on link 
Participants 
276 
Unusable responses 
- did not view case, responded only to informed consent 
-viewed case, other than informed consent, did not respond 
(spent less than one minute) 
-viewed case, responded to three or fewer questions 
-viewed case, did not complete 
Total unusable data 
-removed due to inappropriate responses on reverse coded 
questions (preference - all questions answered with one answer) 
Complete responses 
Final Response rate of those who clicked 
3.4 Task and Procedure 
(46) 
(37) 
(5) 
D.fil 
D.Qfil 
170 
ill 
61% 
The case begins with each participant reading a statement asking them to assume the role 
of CFO for WIEL Inc., a publically traded company which sells electronic equipment. 31 
After reading the case specific to their experimental treatment, participants were 
informed they would have a meeting with the audit partner to discuss the audit difference. 
In all conditioi:is, the audit firm's accounting expertise and the state of the initial 
relationship between the partner and client were specified, as these were found to have a 
specific importance to the CFO (Gibbins et al., 2005; Gibbins et al., 2007). All versions 
of the case began with a dialogue briefly discussing that had had a good relationship with 
the partner in the past, giving a positive frame to all participants. Negotiation literature 
31 Participants were asked to read and sign an informed consent statement before beginning the case. 
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suggests that framing significantly affects all aspects of the negotiation (Chang, Cheng, & 
Trotman, 2008; Elangovan, 2005; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Neale, Huber, & Northcraft, 
1987; Neale & Bazerman, 1992). The opening dialogue with the audit partner was 
presented where the adjustment was proposed (along with the rationale for the 
adjustment) as well as whether (and how) the PPD was involved (influence tactic). 
Participants could choose to view the company's financial statements at virtually any time 
during the study. Participants were then asked a series of questions about the adjustment, 
their satisfaction with the audit partner, and manipulation check questions. Lastly, 
participants were asked questions relating to their own preference of auditor-types and 
some demographic information. The full experimental instrument is included in 
Appendix A. 
The case was adapted with permission from the 2007 Accounting Review publication by 
Sanchez et al. (2007). As in Sanchez et al. (2007), the significant adjustment involves a 
recently acquired product line for which the auditor's estimate of warranty expense differs 
from the client's. The CFO is informed of a disagreement over an accounting issue 
(warranty accrual) with the audit partner. As in many audit negotiation studies, one issue 
was chosen (Brown-Liburd & Wright, 2011; Perreault & Kida, 2011; 2007; Tan & 
Trotman, 2010; Wang & Tuttle, 2009) for simplification purposes and because research 
shows that CFOs generally view negotiations as dealing with one issue only (although 
auditor's typically view an issue as one of a larger set) (Gibbins et al., 2005; Salterio, 
2012). I chose a subjective adjustment because such items often entail more negotiation 
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than an objective, clear cut issue such as a client error where little or no negotiation is 
required. Furthermore, subjective issues are often more contentious and more difficult to 
convince the client to record (Beattie et al., 2000; Brown-Liburd & Wright, 2011; 
Gibbins et al., 2001; Wright & Wright, 1997). 32 This is also consistent with much of the 
auditor-client negotiation research, where subjective, estimate adjustments such as 
inventory valuation (Brown-Liburd & Wright, 2011; Goodwin, 2002; McCracken, 
Salterio, & Schmidt, 2011; Trotman et al., 2005; Trotman et al., 2009), warranty accruals 
(Hatfield, Jackson, & Vanderveld, 2007; Hatfield et al., 2008; Perreault & Kida, 2011; 
Sanchez et al., 2007) and allowance for doubtful accounts (Hatfield et al., 2007; 
McCracken et al., 2011) have been used. 
The case begins with the premise that the PPD has been consulted, agrees with the 
partner and the audit partner must now choose whether, and how to disclose this 
involvement to the client. 33 In McCracken et al. (2008), some audit partners suggested 
that the decision to disclose involvement of the technical research group explicitly is 
strategic and dependent on CFO preferences and requirements (McCracken et al., 2008). 
This strategic involvement was also suggested in Gibbins et al. (2005) where auditors 
32 It is also interesting to study a subjective adjustment as estimates allow for a richer negotiation context as 
the amount can be negotiated, not only whether an adjustment should be booked at all. Ng (2007) also 
notes that auditors are more likely to book an audit difference when it is more objective in nature. 
Therefore, it is important to study ways to help influence clients to book more subjective differences and 
help mitigate potential earnings management attempts. 
33 This study is seeking to explore how communicating involvement of the PPD impacts the audit 
negotiation. Therefore, starting with the premise of an agreement between the audit partner and PPD 
allows me to focus on this objective. In practice, there may not be agreement between the audit partner and 
PPD; however, the discussions between the audit partner and PPD and how they reach their internal 
agreement are not the focus of this paper. See Ng & Shankar (2010) for the effect of PPD on the auditor's 
propensity to accept client-preferred accounting methods. 
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reported involvement of the PPD I 00% of the time and the CFO reported being aware of 
their involvement only 50% of the time. Although sometimes the PPD can be in direct 
contact with the CFO (McCracken et al., 2008), this paper examines the typical context in 
which the partner acts as an intermediary between the CFO and the PPD. 
3.5 Independent Variables 
To examine my research questions and test my hypotheses I employ a 3 (influence tactic) 
x 2 (auditor-type) x 2 (CFO's preference for auditor-type) between-subjects complete 
factorial design. In all cases, the PPD has been consulted; however, the way in which 
the PPD involvement is communicated (if at all) to influence the client is manipulated. 
The three levels of influence tactics are: a) the PPD involvement is not communicated to 
the client (i.e. the client is unaware the PPD has been consulted) and therefore the audit 
partner relies on reason alone b) the PPD involvement is communicated to the client as a 
collaborative colleague (coalition), c) the PPD involvement is communicated to the client 
as a higher authority. The two auditor type manipulations are a) expert crusader and b) 
accommodator. The 2 CFO preference levels are a) preference for an expert crusader and 
b) preference for an accommodator. Influence tactic and auditor-type are manipulated 
variables while CFO preference for auditor type is a measured variable. 
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The first independent variable is CFO preference for auditor-type, which represents the 
preferred role the CFO would like the auditor to play. CFO preferred auditor-type has 
two levels, 'Expert Crusader' or 'Accommodator' and it is a measured variable. To 
distinguish between the two audit partner-types, 17 questions are posed relating to items 
identified by McCracken et al (2008). Participants report their own personal experience 
or views on how much they agree/disagree with statements (on a 6-po-int scale) designed 
to determine whether they prefer their auditor to be more like an 'expert crusader' or 
'accommodator'. 34' 35 This CFO preference for auditor-type variable was not manipulated 
as it is not reasonable to tell participants what type of auditor they should prefer. 
The next independent variable; auditor-type, is manipulated throughout the case to 
differentiate between the 'expert crusader' type auditor and the more laid back 
accommodator auditor-type. The manipulations are based on both McCracken et al. 
(2008) and Beattie et al. (2004) auditor-types/roles described. These studies are based 
on interviews with CFOs and audit partners themselves. It is important to note that· both 
of the auditor-types and the manipulations to portray them highlight the difference in how 
they perform their duties, not the quality of their work. Both auditor-types are portrayed 
as highly competent and knowledgeable both of the industry and of the client's company. 
34 1 =strongly disagree, 6= strongly agree 
35 Approximately one half of the questions were posed so that participants would answer in agreement and 
the other half in disagreement. These responses were then reverse coded in the analysis. This resulted in a 
higher sum corresponding to individuals preferring an expert crusader type auditor and a lower total 
corresponding to individuals preferring an accommodating auditor-type. Furthermore, questions were 
presented in a random order to participants. 
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The third independent variable represents the influence tactic used (if/how the PPD's 
involvement is communicated). The three levels of influence are manipulated via a 
paragraph inserted into the partner's opening dialogue to the client. In the reason (no 
communication) version, the partner did not communicate the involvement of the PPD to 
the client and therefore the client is unaware that the PPD has been consulted. In the 
coalition version, the partner discloses to the CFO that the PPD has been contacted and 
presents them as a collaborative colleague who also agrees with the partner's 
recommendation to post the adjusting entry. In the higher authority version, the partner 
also communicates the involvement of the PPD, but this time presents them as a higher 
authority who agrees with the adjustment and that it is the PPD's opinion that the issue 
needs to be resolved. 
Refer to Appendix A for the full instrument and Table 4 for a summary of the 
experimental conditions 
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Table 4: Summary of Experimental Conditions36 
Auditor-type37 CF038 Influence Tactic39 
Auditor-type Reason Coalition Higher 
Preference Authority 
Expert CFO Preference 
Crusader for Expert 1 2 3 
Auditor-type Crusader 
CFO Preference 
for 1 2 3 
Accommodator 
Accommodator CFO Preference 
Auditor-type for Expert 4 5 6 
Crusader 
CFO Preference 
for 4 5 6 
Accommodator 
3.6 Dependent Variables 
The outcome to financial statements is measured by asking participants to record their 
willingness to post the adjustment on an 11 point-scale. 40 This measure is used to test HI 
through H3. To test H4 and HS, data on participants' satisfaction with the auditor, also 
measured on an 11 point scale was used. 41 Both the willingness to post adjustment and 
the satisfaction with the audit partner were also used as dependent variables in Sanchez et 
al. (2007). 
36 Auditor-type is a manipulated variable with 2 levels, and Influence Tactic is a manipulated variable with 
3 levels resulting in 6 versions of the case. The number indicated in the cell corresponds to the version 
number of the case. CFO auditor-type preference is a measured variable and thus does not impact the 
number of versions of the case. 
37 Manipulated variable, 2 levels (Expert Crusader /Accommodator) 
38 Measured variable, 2 levels (Preference for Expert Crusader/ Accommodator) 
39 Manipulated variable, 3 levels (Reason/Coalition/Higher Authority) 
40 1 =Completely unwilling, 11 =Very willing 
41 1 =Completely dissatisfied, 11 =Very satisfied 
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3. 7 Pretesting 
Pretesting of the instrument was conducted in three phases. 42 In the first phase, the 
instrument was reviewed by 5 accounting academic faculty, all of whom have 
professional designations. The second phase was a verbal protocol with five individuals 
with significant CFO/controller experience. The participants each read the case and then 
verbally went over their thought process when answering the questions. The third phase 
used 40 MBA students as participants with a pen and paper version of the case. Based on 
results of this three step pre-testing, a number of changes were made to both the case and 
question wording. 
During verbal protocol, the experience of the audit partner was questioned and discussed 
as well as the amount of work done by the audit team versus the client by two of the 
CFOs. As a result, additional information on the experience of the partner and his 
familiarity with the client was incorporated into the case. Additionally, a sentence 
regarding the amount of work that the audit team had done on the proposed estimate was 
also added. 
The wording of the case was also modified to make the CFO's experience be more 
conversational, as a 'dialogue' with the audit partner. As such, the 'Required' heading 
was removed and the paragraph below was reworded to reflect that they would be 
42 Pretesting was conducted in July 2010. 
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engaged in a 'meeting' with the audit partner the next day to discuss the outstanding 
issue. 
The placement of the financial statements and the paragraph before the financial 
statements was modified based on the amount of time participants spent on analyzing the 
financial statements. In the paper version of the experiment which was used during 
pretesting, the financial statements were initially placed before informing the participants 
of the issue to be discussed and the paragraph before the financial statements directed the 
participants to 'familiarize' themselves with the financial statements. As a result, each of 
the CFOs spent a significant amount of time analyzing the financial statements before 
moving on to the issue identified in the case, and then returned again to analyze the 
financial statements after being informed of the issue. This resulted in the case taking 
more time than what was expected or what was reasonable to ask participants without 
adding any benefit. As a result, for the electronic version of the instrument, the financial 
statements were linked to the instrument and the link was available to the participants at 
any time they wished to view them. The paragraph was reworded to reflect their 
availability throughout the study. 
Other minor wording and clarification issues were identified through the process and 
amended for the final version of the instrument. 
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4.0 Analysis and Discussion of Results 
4.1 Manipulation Checks 
Complete data were provided by I 69 participants. Manipulation check questions for the 
two manipulated independent variables were provided to the participants to ensure their 
understanding and careful reading of the case. Manipulation checks for influence tactic 
were completed through a series of questions. Participants were asked to respond to an 
initial question on whether the PPD was involved and then two follow-up questions 
(using smart logic) regarding their degree of authority. One question had two choices on 
how the PPD was involved and one question was on an I I-point scale on how much 
authority they felt the PPD had over the audit partner (I= "no authority over partner" and 
I I ="complete authority"). All participants in the Reason (no communication) condition 
correctly identified that the PPD was not involved. Three participants in the Higher 
Authority condition answered incorrectly that the PPD was not involved; however, two of 
the three participants correctly answered the follow-up questions regarding the degree of 
authority. Means for the follow-up question are significantly different and directionally 
consistent with the manipulation (tc96) = 9.373, p < .OOOI). The mean responses are 5.82 
(SD=2.375) and 9.69 (SD=l.703) for the coalition and higher authority condition 
respectively. I include the two participants who incorrectly answered the initial question 
because their follow-up questions were correctly answered (and exclude one participant). 
In addition to the two questions distinguishing between the influence tactics of coalition 
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and higher authority, there was one question to test for auditor type. Three participants 
failed all three manipulation check questions; eight failed both questions regarding 
influence tactic; and one failed one of the influence tactic questions and the auditor-type 
question. A further two participants were removed as identified outliers as their answer 
to one of the manipulation questions was significantly outside of the normal range which 
may indicate a lack of understanding of the manipulations. As a result, 15 participants 
were removed, resulting in useable data from 154 participants43• 44 • 
4.2 Auditor Preference 
CFO preference for auditor-type has two levels, 'expert crusader' or 'accommodator'. It 
is a measured variable based on answers to 17 items relating to auditor-type identified by 
McCracken et al.' s (2008) interviews as distinguishing the two types of auditors and also 
follows a process similar to that in Gendron et al. (2006). Participants report their own 
personal experience or views on how much they agree/disagree with statements (on a 6-
point scale) designed to determine whether they prefer their auditor to be more like an 
'expert crusader' or 'accommodator'. 45 A proximately one half of the questions were 
posed so that participants would answer in agreement and the other half in disagreement. 
These responses were then reverse coded in the analysis. This resulted in a higher sum 
corresponding to individuals preferring an expert crusader type auditor and a lower total 
43 Patterns of cell means and inferences are the same as those reported if these participants are included. 
44 No significant demographic differences were found between the experimental conditions, suggesting 
successful random assignment of participants. Non-response bias was assessed by comparing the early 
versus late responders which showed no significant differences. 
45 I =strongly disagree, 6= strongly agree 
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corresponding to individuals preferring an accommodating type auditor. Questions were 
presented in a computer generated random order to participants. The items resulted in a 
Cronbach' s alpha of. 72, indicating a high degree of reliability of the measure, a result 
similar to that obtained by Gendron et al. (2006). A histogram of the sum of the items 
shows a bimodal distribution as predicted (corresponding to the two roles outlined in 
McCracken et al. (2008)) with a low point approximately at the median, also supporting 
its face validity. 46 Similar to the process used in Bame-Aldred & Kida (2007) and 
Brown & Johnstone (2009), I construct a dichotomous 'Prefered Auditor Type' variable 
by splitting the data at the median. The median was seen as a reasonable point to split the 
data both theoretically, and statistically. Therefore, participants will be divided along the 
median response and coded as either more inclined to prefer an 'expert crusader' auditor 
type or an 'accommodating' type auditor. 
46 Kurtosis of-.017. A necessary condition ofbimodality is kurtosis less than zero (Muratov, 2010). 
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4.3 Testing Hypotheses 
Testing of the five hypotheses will be divided into the two categories of willingness to 
post (Hl-H3) and satisfaction with the audit partner (H4-H5)47 • 
4.3.1 Willingness to post adjustment 
The descriptive statistics for willingness to post are summarized in Table 5, and a 2 x 2 x 
3 ANOV A model (CFO preference x Auditor-type x Influence tactic), with willingness 
to post adjustment as the dependent variable is presented in Table 6. HI through H3 
relate to the effects of the three factors on the CFOs' willingness to post an adjustment to 
the financial statements. HI relates to the effect of CFOs preferred auditor-type on their 
willingness to adjust the financial statements. As can be seen from Table 6, and 
consistent with HI, there is a significant main effect for CFO' s preference of auditor-type 
(F(i, 142)= 9.293, p = .003), which indicates that the CFO's auditor-type preference 
significantly affects their willingness to post the adjustment. The estimated marginal 
mean (standard error) of willingness to post was in the direction predicted, sh9wing a 
greater willingness to adjust for those with an expert crusader auditor-type preference, 
6.305 (.295) compared to CFOs with an accommodator auditor-type preference, 5.049 
(.288). Thus, as predicted, CFOs who prefer more proactive, advising audit partners are 
more willing to adjust the financial statements than CFOs who prefer more reactive, 
accommodating audit partners. Thus HI is supported. 
47 Experience, current position, gender, designations and type of company were tested to ensure there was 
no impact of these variables on the dependent variables. None of the variables were significant (p-value 
>.324) and therefore were not included as covariates in the analyses. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: Means (standard deviation) of Willingness to Post Adjustment48 
CFO Preference Auditor-ty1 Je total Total 
Preference for Expert Crusader Preference for Accommodator 
Expert Accommod Total Expert Accommodator- Total Expert Accommodator-
Crusader ator-type Crusader type Crusader type 
-type -type -type 
Reason 6.23 6.67 6.46 4.40 5.23 4.79 5.25 6.00 5.63 
(2.743) (1.988) (2.333) (2.971) (2.948) (2.936) (2.964) (2.539) (2.761) 
n=13 n=l5 28 n=l5 n=13 n=28 n=28 n=28 n=56 
Coalition 5.60 6.00 5.79 5.00 5.53 5.32 5.30 5.71 5.52 
(2.221) (2.550) 2.323 (1.886) (2.295) (2.116) (2.029) (2.349) (2.194) 
n=lO n=9 n=l9 n=lO n=l5 n=25 n=20 n=24 n=44 
Higher 5.56 7.77 6.55 3.46 6.67 5.00 4.62 7.24 5.83 
Authority 
(2.308) (2.127) (2.458) (2.106) (3.525) (3.253) (2.426) (2.876) (2.932) 
n=l6 n=13 n=29 n=13 n=l2 n=25 n=29 n=25 n=54 
Column 5.79 6.89 6.33 4.24 5.77 5.03 5.03 6.31 5.67 
Total 
(2.397) (2.233) (2.369) (2.454) (2.904) (2.787) (2.534) (2.647) (2.662) 
n=39 n=37 n=76 n=38 n=40 m=78 n=77 n=77 n=l54 
48 Willingness to post adjustment where 1 =Completely unwilling, l l=Very willing. 
Table 6: ANOV A Results for Willingness to Post Adjustment 
Indeoendent Variable df F-Statistic o-value 
CFO's Auditor-type Preference 1 9.293 .003 Hl 
Auditor-type 1 9.479 .002 
Influence tactic 2 0.226 .798 H2 
Auditor-type x CFO Preference 1 0.381 .538 
Auditor-type x Influence Tactic 2 3.149 .046 H3 
CFO Preference x Influence Tactic 2 0.708 .494 
Auditor-type x CFO Preference x 2 0.096 .909 
Tactic 
H2 relates to the effect of the reason and coalition influence tactic on the client's 
willingness to adjust the financial statements. As can be seen from Table 6, Influence 
tactic shows no significant main effect (Fc2,142)= 0.226, p = .798), with an estimated 
marginal mean (standard error) for reason 5.632 (.337), coalition 5.533 (.387) and higher 
authority 5.865 (.345). However, this result needs to be considered in light of the 
significant interaction of Auditor-type x Influence tactic (F(2,142) = 3.149, p = .046). The 
graph of the interaction is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Effect of Auditor-Type and Influence Tactic on CFO's Willingness to Post 
Adjustment49 
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The graph of the interaction in Figure 2 shows the effects are driven from the results in 
the higher authority condition. Following up on the interaction with a simple effects test 
results in a significant effect for auditor-type in the higher authority condition (Fci,so) = 
15.075, p<.000) and no significant effects for the other two conditions (both p-values 
>.382). This supports H3 which predicted an interaction in this most aggressive 
condition and supports results found in the traditional negotiation literature where 
aggressive tactics and aggressive negotiators can result in spirals dow.nward toward 
ineffective negotiations. 
49 1 =Completely unwilling, 11 =Very willing 
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H2 predicted CFOs in the coalition condition would be more willing to adjust the 
financial statements than CFOs in the reason condition. Simple contrasts indicate that 
contrary to H2, there is no significant difference in the willingness to adjust the financial 
statements between the coalition and reason condition (Fo,142) = 0.04, p = .848). Perhaps 
CFOs already believe that the PPD may have been contacted by the partner before 
coming to the CFO for an adjustment even in the reason condition, and thus no difference 
was found between the two conditions. An alternative explanation is that perhaps when 
the PPD's involvement is communicated in a more consultative fashion, CFOs view the 
PPD as an extension of the audit partner and thus no difference was detected. 
Although not specifically hypothesized, auditor-type was explored to determine the 
relationship with the clients' willingness to adjust. The estimated marginal mean 
(standard error) for willingness to post was higher for those CFOs who were paired with 
an accommodator auditor-type, 6.311 (.291) than those CFOs who were paired with an 
expert crusader type auditor, 5.042 (.292). As can be seen from Table 5, there is a 
significant main effect for auditor-type (F(l,142) = 9.4 79, p = .002), however, these results 
need to be interpreted in light of the significant higher order interaction. On the surface, 
these exploratory results suggest that accommodating auditor-types are more likely to be 
associated with a CFO's increased willingness to post adjustments than expert crusader 
auditor-types. However, as can be seen from Figure 2, the cells driving these results are 
those hypothesized in the interaction in H3. Post-hoc t-tests (using Tukey adjustment) 
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show no significant differences between conditions other than those as hypothesized in 
H3 (all p-values >.061). 
4.3.2 CFO satisfaction with the audit partner 
The descriptive statistics for satisfaction with the audit partner are summarized in Table 
7, and a 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA model (CFO preference x Auditor-type x Influence tactic), 
with satisfaction wJth the audit partner as the dependent variable is presented in Table 8. 
H4 and HS relate to the effects of the factors on the CFOs' satisfaction with the audit 
partner. H4a and H4b relate to the effect of influence tactic on the client's satisfaction 
with the audit partner. As reason and coalition are not aggressive influence tactics, and 
consulting in an audit environment is an institutional norm, it is hypothesized that there 
will be no difference between these two conditions. However, as the influence tactic 
increases in aggressiveness, it is hypothesized this will decrease a CFO's satisfaction 
with the audit partner. Estimated marginal means (standard error) for satisfaction with 
the audit partner of the reason condition and coalition condition are 6.876 (.323) and 
6.689 (.370) respectively, and the estimated mean satisfaction (standard error) in the 
higher authority condition is 5.243 (.330). Contrast testing supports H4a and H4b and 
results are depicted in Figure 3. As hypothesized, there is no significant effect between 
the two influence tactics of reason and coalition (F(1,142) = 0.14, p = . 704) , and consistent 
with H4b, there is a significant effect for satisfaction between the higher authority 
76 
conditions compared to the others (F(1,142)= 14.0, p < .000) which indicates that using the 
most aggressive influence tactic decreases the CFOs satisfaction with the auditor. 
Figure 3: Effect of Influence Tactic on CFO's Satisfaction with the Audit Partner50 
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H5 predicts an interaction between the CFOs preferred auditor type and type of auditor 
received. This hypothesis teases out the differences in matching a CFO with their 
preferred auditor-type. Role expectations are expected to manifest themselves in the 
satisfaction scores as matching an assertive, constantly advising expert-crusader auditor 
type with someone who prefers a more laid-back accommodating auditor is expected to 
have the lowest satisfaction ratings. This mismatch is only expected when the auditor is 
more aggressive than the CFO prefers and is not expected where the auditor-type is less 
aggressive. As such, it is hypothesized that CFO preference of auditor-type and actual 
auditor-type will interact to affect the CFO's satisfaction such that the lowest satisfaction 
50 Satisfaction with the audit partner where 1 =Completely dissatisfied, 11 =Very satisfied 
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ratings will occur for CFOs who prefer accommodating-type auditors but are matched 
with expert crusader type auditors compared to the other groups. Table 8 shows the 
results of the ANOV A. A significant effect is found for the interaction of Auditor Type x 
CFO Preference (F(J,J42)= 5.258, p = .023) . A graph of the interaction is shown in 
Figure 4. 
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics: Means (standard deviation) of Satisfaction51 
CFO Preference Auditor-type total Total 
Preference for Expert Crusader Preference for Accommodator 
Expert Accommod Total Expert Accommodator- Total Expert Accommodator-
Crusader a tor-type Crusader type Crusader type 
-type -type -type 
Reason 7.85 6.67 7.21 6.07 6.92 6.46 6.89 6.79 6.84 
(2.075) (2.127) (2.149) (2.520) (2.253) (2.396) (2.455) (2.149) (2.287) 
n=13 n=15 28 n=15 n=13 n=28 n=28 n=28 n=56 
Coalition 7.30 7.22 7.26 5.10 7.13 6.32 6.20 7.17 6.73 
(2.263) (2.279) 2.207 (2.807) (2.232) (2.626) (2.726) (2.2) (2.472) 
n=lO n=9 n=19 n=lO n=15 n=25 n=20 n=24 n=44 
Higher 5.13 5.77 5.41 4.08 6.00 5.00 4.66 5.88 5.22 
Authority 
(2.778) (2.242) (2.529) (2.565) (2.629) (2.723) (2.690) (2.386) (2.604) 
n=16 n=13 n=29 n=13 n=12 n=25 n=29 n=25 n=54 
Column 6.59 6.49 6.54 5.13 6.73 5.95 5.87 6.61 6.24 
Total 
(2.682) (2.219) (2.452) (2.683) (2.353) (2.628) (2.764) (2.278) (2.552) 
n=39 n=37 n=76 n=38 n=40 m=78 n=77 n=77 n=154 
51 Satisfaction with the audit partner where 1 =Completely dissatisfied, 11 =Very satisfied. 
Table 8: ANOV A Results for Satisfaction with Audit Partner 
Indeoendent Variable df F-Statistic o-value 
CFO's Auditor-type Preference 1 3.828 .052 
Auditor-type 1 3.150 .078 
Influence tactic 2 7.248 .001 
Auditor-type x CFO Preference 1 5.258 .023 
Auditor-type x Influence Tactic 2 1.349 .263 
CFO Preference x Influence Tactic 2 0.276 .759 
Auditor-type x CFO Preference x 2 .0117 .890 
Tactic 
Figure 4: Effect of Preferred Auditor-Type and Actual Auditor-Type on CFO's 
Satisfaction with the Audit Partner52 . 
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52 Satisfaction with the audit partner where 1 =Completely dissatisfied, 11 =Very satisfied 
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The graph of the interaction shows the effects are driven from the results in the expert 
crusader auditor-type condition and shows CFOs who have a preference for an 
accommodating auditor-type are less satisfied when they are matched with a more 
aggressive auditor. Following up on the interaction with contrast tests results in a 
significant effect for CFO Preference for an accommodating auditor but matched with an 
expert crusader-type auditor compared to the other pairings (Fci,142)= 12.02, p=.001)53 . 
53 An alternate potential dependent variable, "satisfaction with the way the audit partner handled the 
warranty adjustment" was also elicited. This variable is highly correlated (.815) with the variable used in 
the above analysis and inferences are the same as the variable used. 
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5.0 Discussion 
Auditors must balance their duty to ensure financial statements are free of material 
misstatement while simultaneously fostering a functional working relationship with the 
client. Both the quality of the financial statements and the livelihood of the auditor are at 
stake when there is a disagreement between the auditor's perception of the financial 
statements and the client's. To help ensure this quality, auditors often seek the advice of 
the PPD within their firm, and studies show their advice plays an important role in the 
audit negotiation (Gibbins et al., 2001; Gibbins et al., 2005; McCracken et al., 2008). 
However, little is known about how this department and their involvement in the 
negotiation affect either the financial outcome, or the satisfaction of the CFO with the 
resolution process. This is important as research shows that the PPD is deeply and 
frequently involved in the negotiation and their involvement is known by the client 50% 
of the time (Gibbins et al., 2005). Furthermore, negotiations take place within a 
continuing auditor-client relationship, and McCracken et al. (2008) find that it is the CFO 
who positions the auditor into a preferred type, either an expert crusader , or an 
accommodating-type, and the satisfaction of the CFO is affected by the appropriateness 
of the auditors' actions with respect to these preferred auditor-type. This study builds on 
this previous research and explores if/how different strategies of communicating the 
involvement of the PPD affects both the financial and relationship outcome of the 
negotiation while considering the clients preferred auditor type. 
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I find that the CFO's preferred auditor-type (expert crusader/accommodator) has a 
significant impact on both the financial outcome of the negotiation as well as an 
interactive effect with auditor type on the CFO's satisfaction with the auditor. Thus, 
overall, as hypothesized, clients are more likely to adjust their financial statements when 
they prefer expert-crusader type auditors, and less willing to accept changes when they 
prefer more accommodating audit partners. This supports the result suggested by 
interviews conducted in McCratken et al. 's (2008) study that CFOs who prefer 
accommodator-auditor types are more strongly committed to their position. CFO's 
preferred auditor-type also interacts with assigned auditor-type as hypothesized. CFOs 
that prefer an accommodating auditor-type but are matched with a more proactive expert-
crusader auditor-type report the least satisfaction with the audit partner. This is 
consistent with the results from McCracken et al. (2008) who find that it is really the 
CFO who positions the auditor into an auditor-type, while the auditor is left to try and 
balance the relationship within this predefined position. If the auditor is more proactive 
and persistent than what the CFO prefers and expects, the CFO becomes dissatisfied with 
the audit partner. McCracken et al. (2008) find that this mismatch can often result in 
audit firms replacing the audit-partner to better match the CFO's preference, and in fact 
this happened in three of the eight dyads in their study, where expert-crusader type audit 
partners were replaced with more accommodating audit partners to match the CFO's 
preferred auditor-type. 54 
54 In another dyad, an accommodating audit partner was removed because the CFO desired an expert-
crusader auditor-type. The company was said to be concerned that tht; engagement partner was too 
accommodating of the company's wishes and worried the partner would not question their accounting. I 
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Interestingly, although I find results for involving the PPD, not all results were as 
hypothesized. Involving the PPD as colleagues in the firm who also supported the 
adjustment (coalition) was not found to have any influence on the CFO's willingness to 
post the adjustment, contrary to hypothesis two. Perhaps this was due to the highly 
consultative audit-environment, where involving the PPD could be seen as a normal 
procedure and thus the actual act of communicating their involvement had no impact in 
influencing the CFO, as they might already have known the PPD might be involved, 
whether or not that fact was communicated to them. However, involving the PPD as a 
higher authority had mixed results with respect to the CFO's willingness to adjust as 
hypothesized. For audit partners who are normally accommodating, bringing in the PPD 
resulted in increased CFO willingness to adjust. Higher authority has been found in prior 
studies to be effective in difficult negotiations settings, and auditors facing CFOs who 
prefer accommodating-type auditors would fit into this difficult setting. Furthermore, 
involving the PPD in this way would certainly highlight the issue to the CFO and show 
that the audit-partner is serious about the issue and will not easily back down. It also 
represents a change in strategy, from a more accommodating stance to a more contending 
stance. Strategy change has been found to be effective in negotiations (Olekalns & 
Smith, 2000). However, for audit partners who are more persistent and assertive on their 
own, adding this aggressive tactic resulted in the reverse response from CFOs. A more 
antagonistic response (significantly less willingness to adjust) and potentially the start of 
did not test a scenario similar to this in the present study, as even the accommodating auditor in my study 
was asking for an adjustment to be made. 
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a downward spiral as found in traditional negotiation literature resulted when involving 
the PPD in this way. 
Although involving the PPD as a higher authority tactic resulted in the greatest amount of 
willingness to adjust the financial statements when paired with accommodating auditor 
types, any auditor who used this influence tactic suffered from the lowest satisfaction 
scores from the CFOs. As Weiss (2012) notes, overly assertive negotiators are often 
penalized by their counterparts and can cause animosity, broken relationships, damage to 
reputations, and other negative short and long-term consequences. Therefore, although 
this tactic could be successfully used to persuade some clients to adjust the financial 
statements, its use could potentially damage the relationship between the CFO and audit-
partner as suggested. In previous non-audit negotiation studies, both coalition and higher 
authority are seen as aggressive influence tactics, and result in poor performance reviews 
by the rater (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988). However, in this audit negotiation setting, 
although higher authority is associated with the lowest satisfaction ratings (actually 
reporting dissatisfaction), there is no statistical difference between auditor satisfaction 
ratings who use coalition and reason influence tactics. Thus in an audit context, seeking 
support from the PPD, when communicated and presented as colleagues, has no negative 
outcome to the satisfaction reported by the CFO. This finding helps supports the claims 
that the audit negotiation contains various contextual features which makes the audit 
negotiation setting unique from a general negotiations setting. 
85 
Thus, as discussed by McCracken et al. (2008), and supported here, it would be beneficial 
for auditors to develop strategies to foster a change in CFOs preferences, and try to 
develop a proactive relationship where they desire the audit-partner to act in accordance 
with an expert-crusader. These CFOs consistently had the highest satisfaction rating and 
were more likely to adjust the financial statements when asked, regardless if the PPD was 
involved as a coalition or not involved at all (from their perception). However, when 
dealing with a CFO with an expert crusader auditor-type preference, it is important not to 
use overtly aggressive tactics, as this would likely result in an antagonistic response and 
both a decrease in willingness to adjust and decreased satisfaction ratings. 
This study also highlights the pervasive impact of CFO's preference of auditor-type on 
negotiation outcomes. This was a key finding in McCracken et al. (2008); however, no 
study to date has tested or incorporated this critical variable into audit-negotiation 
studies. I offer a way to measure this key variable and find support for the McCracken et 
al. (2008) finding that the CFO's preference for auditor-type impacts their willingness to 
adjust the financial statements. I also find support for their conclusions that these 
preferences shape the expectations of what is perceived as an appropriate action, and 
show that operating outside of these preferences results in lower satisfaction ratings. 
From a practical standpoint, these findings provide guidance to audit practitioners on how 
to maintain a good working relationship with the client in order to serve them in. future 
years. This relationship is especially important as client management have substantial 
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influence over issues such as auditor retention and compensation. Furthermore, it offers 
auditors insights on potential strategies to use during auditor-client negotiations. In 
previous research, it has been shown that auditors may not be very strategic in terms of 
planned negotiation strategies (Bame-Aldred & Kida, 2007) or opening bids (Brown & 
Johnstone, 2009), thus resulting in adjustments that may result in lower quality financial 
statements, as in Ng & Tan (2003). Part of this lack of strategy has been attributed to an 
auditor's perception that some tactics are unprofessional. For instance, Ng & Tan (2003) 
find that a tactic beginning with a high initial position with the intent to later lower this 
demand is unprofessional. Understanding strategies of communication of PPD 
involvement and how they impact the client provides insight on audit practice 
interventions (e.g. training) that may improve audit quality, but it also highlights the cost 
associated with these strategies. 
As well as audit practitioners, client management can benefit from this study in both an 
audit-negotiation setting and in a more general setting. Understanding the influence 
tactics used by the audit partner can help the CFO defend against the influence tactics and 
not be unduly persuaded by a particular tactic. For instance, involving the PPD as a 
higher authority resulted in some CFOs to be more likely to adjust the financial 
statements. By being aware that the audit partner is using this tactic to persuade and 
bringing it to the forefront of the negotiation will likely help offset its effectiveness, and 
then a decision can be made on the financial statements, independent of the tactic at hand. 
In general, understanding influence tactics and the difference between them can be 
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valuable for anyone trying to persuade others. This research specifically examines two 
influence tactics involving others: understanding these tactics and the subtle distinctions 
among these tactics can help not only in an audit-negotiation setting, but within all 
settings in an organization. This research shows that there may be situations where one 
influence tactic is more effective than others and shows that the expectations of others 
can impact negotiated outcomes. Whether it is trying to motivate subordinates, peers or 
higher management, having well developed mental models of influence tactics can help 
anyone become more effective in influencing people whose support and cooperation they 
need. 
5.1 Limitations and Future Research 
As with all research, there are limitations that need to be addressed. This study was 
conducted electronically. Although matching of controller/CFO participant with an in-
person negotiator would likely improve external validity, as most auditor-client 
negotiations are conducted in-person, this matching is logistically challenging. Also, the 
study presents results obtained from a single-negotiation context; however, utilizing a 
communication strategy in one-period would likely affect negotiations in later periods. 
Future research could explore the effect of communicating involvement of the PPD in a 
multi-period negotiation context. Furthermore, this study uses a single adjustment, 
whereas financial statement audits typically result in the detection of two or more 
misstatements. Although actual negotiation may have more than one adjustment, as 
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discussed, CFOs perceive negotiations as dealing with one issue only (Gibbins et al., 
2005; Salterio, 2012). This study uses a context of a subjective adjustment, with support 
of the PPD on the amount of the estimate. Future research might focus on the impact of 
PPD involvement in a scenario where the adjustments are more objective in nature. 
Scenarios in which adjustments are less subjective in nature might show there is a greater 
impact of the PPD involvement, especially in contexts where there is a preference for an 
accommodating auditor type. This paper finds support for the McCracken et al. (2008) 
conclusions that CFO auditor-type preference is a significant contextual feature of audit 
negotiations that should not be overlooked. Incorporating this variable and providing 
further support for the contextualization of the variable should be conducted in future 
research, as well as deepening our theoretical understanding of the interaction between 
the type of auditor and CFO preferences. This could be addressed through the use of 
additional theoretical perspectives, such as expectancy violation. 
5.2 Concluding Comments 
Through an interview based field study of CFO-audit partner dyads, McCracken et al. 
(2008) found that by investigating the 'shadow' negotiation, one could view the 
negotiation in a different light and revealed that it is the CFO who determines the type of 
relationship desired, and thus the type of auditor who fits within that relationship. The 
audit partner is delegated the task of managing the relationship within the CFO's 
expectations so that both viewed the relationship as 'good'. Within this ongoing 
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relationship, the auditor must ensure the financial statements are acceptable in order to 
issue an unqualified report. If the financial statements require an adjustment, the auditor 
must influence the CFO to adjust the financial statements, and also must ensure his 
actions are within the CFO's expectations of acceptable actions. One way to influence 
the CFO would be to obtain and communicate support for the partner's recommendation 
by the PPD. In practice it is found that the PPD is frequently involved on the auditor side 
of the negotiation, but the client is not always aware of their involvement (Gibbins et al., 
2001; Gibbins et al., 2005; McCracken et al., 2008). By incorporating tactics from the 
influence literature, I investigate how involving the PPD in different ways can affect not 
only the financial statements, but also how it can impact the CFO's satisfaction of the 
audit partner within their continuing relationship. With a better understanding of how the 
PPD impacts the negotiation process, partners can be better informed of how to 
effectively manage their relationship with the client while also ensuring high quality 
financial reporting. By investigating the dynamics of the auditor-client management 
relationship and its effects on negotiation outcomes, this helps answer a call by (Gibbins 
et al., 2010). This also answers a call for negotiation research to investigate how one 
negotiation party reacts to the tactics used by the other party (Bame-Aldred & Kida, 
2007) and helps answer a call from McCracken et al. (2008) to investigate 'moves' that 
the auditor can use to help give themselves an upper hand in positioning during the 
negotiation. 
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Appendix A: Instrument 
Instrument: Experiment with Controllers/CFOs as Participants 
(The Effect of Auditors' Communication of the Professional Practice Department's 
Decision on Auditor-Client Negotiations) 
Case Materials 
Note: This is the Coalition /Expert Crusader condition. Differences between this 
and the other versions (No communication /Higher Authority & Accommodator) 
will be noted. 
PLEASE NOTE - THIS SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED IN QUALTRICS USING 
SMART LOGIC. AS SUCH - THERE ARE FORMATTING DIFFERENCES. 
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WIEL Inc. Case Information 
Role and Background Information 
Assume that you are the CFO of WIEL Inc., which sells electronic equipment. The company is a 
public company, based in Ontario; its stock is traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Over the 
past several years, WIEL Inc. has had consistent sales and pretax income growth in the range of 
4-7% per year. These results are consistent with industry averages. 
It is now two months after fiscal year-end and your company is going through its annual audit. 
You have prepared the financial statements and are content with their outcome. The CEO has 
expressed to you that he would like to issue the financial statements "as they are" and would 
prefer not to book any audit adjustments, but he will support your decision on any adjustments. 
You have communicated this to the audit partner. 
Auditor-Client Relationship 
Your company has engaged the current audit firm f~r many years and had the same audit partner 
for the past five years. However, since the beginning of this year's audit, you have a new partner 
as the previous partner has gone on sick leave and is not expected to return. This new partner is 
very familiar with both the industry you are in and your company in particular, as this partner was 
previously the partner in charge of reviewing your audit file. The senior manager and the rest of 
the audit team have remained consistent. Over the years you had developed a good and effective 
working relationship with the previous audit partner and the firm. 
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Since the new audit partner has been assigned to WIEL, the partner has come to meet with you 
and has called on a number of occasions during the year to see if you needed any advice on 
accounting or reporting activities. The partner regularly sends out emails on the changing nature 
of the accounting standards and invites clients to "sit down and chat" on how changing standards 
could impact their business. 
The Audit "Preliminary Findings" 
During the course of the audit, the auditors identified potential audit adjustments and have 
worked with you and your staff throughout the audit to try and resolve these differences. The 
new audit partner has been actively involved throughout the audit process and has been in 
constant contact with you throughout the audit. Many times, the differences proposed by the new 
audit partner were due to 'best practice' or 'industry standards' and standards where early 
adoption was permitted but not required. The partner is extremely meticulous and seems to be 
painstakingly detailed, so some adjustments were to curb "aggressive accounting" conducted 
within GAAP. A lot more additional paperwork has been requested and questioned during the 
audit this year. The partner is maintaining that these best practice and early adoption adjustments 
and disclosures should be done so that the financial statements are of the 'highest quality'. 
All of the proposed adjustments are still outstanding at the end of fieldwork including one 
relating to an estimate. The audit team has communicated a major difference regarding your 
warranty estimate to you. You have been working on this estimate for a while now with your 
staff and believe it is reasonable based on other products and returns to date. The audit team has 
also been working on this difference for a while now. An adjustment was proposed by the audit 
team because of concerns about quality control in a new product line. The audit partner now 
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wishes to discuss this particular difference with you. While the CEO would like to book no 
adjustment, the CEO has given you responsibility for deciding whether or not to book the 
auditors' adjustment and will support your recommendation. 
A Meeting 
You and the partner have arranged a meeting for tomorrow to discuss any outstanding issues. 
The financial statements for WIEL Inc. are included as a link on the following page and will be 
available throughout the survey if you wish to refer to them. You should assume that only the 
balance sheet and the income statement are relevant for this exercise. (The notes to the financial 
statements are not relevant to this study and have been omitted.) 
(1~ ~Not~~::;t'Tbei. ~actofuod~tot'!V~J1$i.on,::iµ~lJi~~<lthe::foll()Wing .. two modified paragraphs .. to 
repfa·ce the third aµd second fo last pan1graph, on the previous page. J 
Since the new audit partner has been assigned to WIEL, the partner has come to meet with you 
and has asked you to call if you have any questions or concerns during the year. The partner has 
suggested some meetings, but you have not taken the partner up on it yet. 
The Audit "Preliminary Findings" 
During the course of the audit, the audit team identified potential audit adjustments and has 
worked with the new audit partner to resolve these differences. The new audit partner seems 
thorough and detailed and has ensured that the financial statements were GAAP-compliant in all 
material respects. Many times, the differences initially proposed and disclosed to you by the 
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audit team were due to 'best practice' or 'industry standards' and some Of the adjustments were 
for new standards where early adoption was permitted but not required. As such, the new partner 
did not push for these adjustments or additional disclosure requirements, as the statements were 
GAAP compliant and you had indicated that you did not want to adjust the financial statements 
unnecessarily. The new partner has been very accommodating and found support for your 
accounting treatment on various issues; even those you knew were quite aggressive within GAAP 
and those that were not consistent with most companies in the industry. 
As such, all differences have been resolved or waived by the end of the fieldwork except one. 
The audit team has communicated a major difference regarding your warranty estimate to you. 
You have been working on this estimate for a while now with your staff and believe it is 
reasonable based on other products and returns to date. The audit team has also been working on 
this difference for a while now. An adjustment was proposed by the audit team because of 
concerns about quality control in a new product line. The audit partner now wishes to discuss this 
difference with you. While the CEO would like to book no adjustment, the CEO has given you 
responsibility for deciding whether or not to book the auditors' adjustment and will support your 
recommendation. 
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WIEL Inc. 
Balance Sheet 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Assets 
Current assets: 
Cash and cash equivalents 
Receivables 
Inventory 
Prepaid advertising 
Other prepaid expenses 
Future income taxes 
Total current assets 
Property, plant and equipment, net 
Intangibles, net 
Total assets 
Liabilities and shareholders' equity 
Current liabilities 
Accounts payable 
Reserve for returns 
Accrued liabilities 
Short-term notes payable 
Income and other taxes payable 
Total current liabilities 
Long-term debt 
Other long-term liabilities 
Shareholders' equity: 
Common stock, 40,200,000 shares issued 
Additional paid-in capital 
Retained earnings 
Total shareholders' equity 
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 
12/31/09 
$17, 176 
8,064 
164,816 
15,824 
5,295 
10,914 
222,089 
98,985 
2,423 
$323,497 
$62,380 
4,555 
25,234 
9,319 
13,256 
114,744 
7,212 
349 
402 
34,565 
166,225 
201, 192 
$323,497 
12/31/08 
$5,426 
4,459 
168,652 
7,506 
3,713 
8,412 
198, 168 
96,991 
2,453 
$297,612 
$52,762 
5,011 
27,678 
7,539 
9,727 
102,717 
5,379 
388 
402 
34,565 
154, 161 
189,128 
$297,612 
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WIEL Inc. 
Income Statement 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Net sales 
Cost of sales 
Gross Profit 
For the year ended 
12/31/09 12/31/08 
$1,031,548 $992,106 
588,017 571,265 
443,531 420,841 
Selling, general and administrative expenses-----------------395,366 374,016 
Income from operations 
Other income (expense): 
Interest expense 
Interest income 
Other 
Total other income (expense), net 
Income before income taxes 
Income tax provision 
Net income 
Net income per share 
48, 165 46,825 
(1,771) (769) 
253 307 
4,278 1,300 
2,760 838 
50,925 47,663 
20,370 19,065 
$30,555 $28,598 
$0.76 $0.72 
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REVIEW FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
The audit partner has met with you to communicate a concern regarding the warranty 
audit adjustment. Below is part of the opening dialogue from your meeting. 
Opening dialogue with the Audit Partner: 
Thank you for taking the time to discuss the end of the audit with me. The audit 
procedures have progressed smoothly this year and your staff has been very helpful and 
has provided us with the requested information in a timely manner. 
Our audit team has completed the fieldwork and has worked with your accounting staff 
and resolved almost all of the adjustments. I know you mentioned that you and the CEO 
would like to book no adjustments; however, I have brought to you the one difference 
that still needs to be resolved at this time. To help you in your analysis I have included 
an explanation below of why we believe an adjustment is necessary. 
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The following is the audit adjustment that needs to be resolved before we can issue an 
unqualified opinion: 
Dr. Warranty expense 2,495,000 
Cr. Liability under warranties 2,495,000 
To increase the warranty expense for the current year. 
Rationale: WIEL Inc. offers a two-year warranty on all of its products. WIEL 
Inc. acquired a new product line during the year and applied the same percentage 
as it applies to its other product lines. However, due to substantial differences in 
quality control for this new product line, the audit team has determined that the 
applied percentage for this line is too low and thus the warranty liability is 
understated. Per review of current year sales and returns for the new product line 
and all other product lines, the audit team believes the Liability under warranties 
account balance should be approximately $8, 100,000. It is currently $5,605,000 
(The liability account is included as part of Accrued liabilities on the Balance 
Sheet and Warranty expense is included as part of Cost of Sales on the Income 
Statement.) 
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I would like to let you to know that I have also discussed this issue with some colleagues 
in our Professional Practice Department. I contacted them as I felt there may be some 
issues on which they could offer some guidance. I provided them with all of the same 
information that you have provided our engagement team. Our colleagues in the 
. Professional Practice Department have significant experience in dealing with matters of 
this kind on a regular basis, and have helped provide guidance to other companies in the 
same industry in situations similar to yours. After reviewing all the information, our 
colleagues are in agreement with the assumptions and calculations used by our 
engagement team and feel the proposed adjustment is reasonable. It is our professional 
judgment that this issue needs to be addressed somehow before we can issue our audit 
report. 
I know you and your staff have put in a lot of time on this issue as well, what are your 
thoughts? 
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Our audit team has completed the fieldwork and we are ready to issue our opinion on the 
financial statements of WIEL Inc. I know you mentioned that you and the CEO would 
like to book no adjustments; however, I have brought to you the one difference that needs 
to be resolved. To help you in your analysis I have included an explanation below of 
why we believe an adjustment is necessary. 
[**Note~~ :~h:e N9,;;.comnui1ikati6n .(r?tional persuasion only) version did not include 
the .s·e~o.lld to~·last! ·pa~~graph · ~nd. the bigher authority version included the following 
modified paragraph. ] 
I would like you to know that I have consulted with the Professional Practice 
Department, which reports directly to our National Office regarding this adjustment. I 
contacted them as I felt there may be some issues on which they could provide their 
judgment. I provided them with the same information that you have provided our 
engagement team. These individuals in the Professional Practice Department have 
significant experience in dealing with matters of this kind on a regular basis, and have 
directed other companies in the same industry in situations similar to yours on how to 
adjust the statements. After consulting with these speci~lists, they were in complete 
agreement with the assumptions and calculations used by our engagement team and have 
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approved the adjustment as outlined above. Now that the Professional Practice 
Department is involved, they have the final authority on signing off on the financial 
statements. It is their professional opinion that this issue needs to be addressed and 
resolved somehow before issuing the firm's unqualified audit report. 
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PART I You may refer back to the unaudited financial statements and other case material 
at any time while filling out Part 1 of this questionnaire. 
Given the information communicated to you by the audit partner, please answer the 
questions regarding the warranty adjustment by clicking the number on the scale which 
best represents your views. 
Dr. Warranty Expense 2,495,000 
Cr. Liability Under Warranties 
1. How willing are you to post this adjustment? 
Completely 
Unwilling 
2 3 4 5 6 
Neutral 
2,495,000 
7 8 9 10 11 
Very 
Willing 
What factors influenced your willingness to post or not post the adjusting journal 
entry? 
2. How agreeable do you think your CEO would be to the posting of this 
adjustment? 
Completely 
Disagreeable 
2 3 4 5 6 
Neutral 
7 8 9 10 11 
Very 
Agreeable 
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3. How fair do you think this adjustment is? 
Completely 
Unfair 
2 3 4 5 6 
Neutral 
7 8 9 10 11 
Very 
Fair 
4. How satisfied are you with the way in which the audit partner involved the 
Professional Practice Department? . 
1 
Completely 
Dissatisfied 
2 3 4 5 6 
Neutral 
7 8 9 10 11 
Very 
Satisfied 
5. What effect did the involvement of the Professional Practice Department have on 
your willingness to post the adjustment? ~ 
1 
No effect 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 
Neutral 
7 8 9 
6. How satisfied are you with the performance of the audit firm? 
Completely 
Dissatisfied 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
· Neutral 
7. How satisfied are you with the performance of the audit partner? 
Completely 
Dissatisfied 
2 3 4 5 6 
Neutral 
7 8 9 
10 
10 
10 
11. 
Very 
significant 
effect 
11 
Very 
Satisfied 
11 
Very 
Satisfied 
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8. How satisfied are you with the way this audit partner handled this warranty 
adjustment? 
Completely 
Dissatisfied 
2 3 4 5 6 
Neutral 
7 8 9 10 11 
Very 
Satisfied 
What factors .influenced your degree of satisfaction with the audit partner during 
your discussion of the audit differences? 
9. How likely are you to recommend using this auditing firm next year for WIEL 
Inc.? 
Completely 
Unlikely 
2 3 4 5 6 
Neutral 
7 8 9 10 11 
Very 
Likely 
What factors would influence your recommendation to retain or not retain the 
auditing firm? 
10. How knowledgeable do you feel the audit partner is with respect to your 
company's warranty issues? 
2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 
Completely 
Unknowledgeable 
6 
Neutral Very 
Knowledgeable 
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11. In this study, your working relationship with the OLD audit partner was described in 
the case facts as a "good and effective working relationship". Do you feel your 
relationship with the NEW audit partner is better or worse? 
Much 
Worse 
2 3 4 5 6 
No 
Change 
7 8 9 10 11 
Much 
Better 
(If you indicated that there was a change (for better or worse), please answer part a) 
below, if you indicated "no change" please go to #12) SMART LOGIC 
IF the working relationship changed, what factors influenced this change? 
12. Would you be inclined to post the full amount of the adjustment to the warranty 
expense ($2,495,000) or make a counter-offer less than the full amount? (Please check 
one) 
Post full amount ($2,495,000) D 
Make a counter-offer (less than $2,495,000) D 
(please indicate your counter-offer below) 
$ _____ _ 
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PART II These questions test your careful reading of the case. 
1. In this case, did the audit partner consult with his/her Professional Practice 
Department? 
(please check one box) 
Yes D NoD No mention of the Professional Practice Department D 
IF YOU ANSWERED YES - Please check the box that would best 
describe how the Professional Practice Department was engaged in the 
warranty issue. 
D the Professional Practice 
Department was engaged 
more as collaborative 
colleagues who had some 
input into the discussion of 
the warranty issue 
D the Professional Practice 
Department was engaged more 
, as specialists who have more 
of a final authority over the 
outcome of the warranty issue 
~~!f.~~~-Please indicate what degree of authority you felt the Professional Practice 
Department had over the audit partner to sign off on the financial statements. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
No Equal Complete 
authority authority authority 
over over partner 
partner 
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The following two questions are related to the best practice and early adoption 
adjustments. Please do NOT consider the warranty adjustment when answering these 
questions. 
3. To what degree do you feel the audit partner wanted you to have the highest 
quality financial statements, including adjusting for best practice and early 
adoption. 
1 
Not at all 
2 3 4 5 6 
Neutral 
7 8 9 10 
4. After the audit partner was satisfied the financial statements were GAAP 
11 
Toa 
high 
degree 
compliant, to what degree do you feel the partner was willing to accommodate 
your preferred accounting choices relating to the best practice and early adoption 
· adjustments. 
1 
Not at all 
2 3 4 5 6 
Neutral 
7 8 9 10 11 
To a 
high 
degree 
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PARTIII 
The following questions are NOT related to the previous case, but should reflect your own personal experience or views. Circle 
the number in the chart below that best represents how much you agree with each statement. 
>-. Q) Q) >-. Q) 
..Q Q) ;;:.... 
- Q) Q) 
- Q) Q) - Q) bO s.... s.... +-' s.... +-' Q) Q) Ol) Q) c:: Ol) Ol) ..s:: Ol) ..s:: s.... s.... s:::: s.... 0 ('j ('j Ol) ('j Ol) bO Ol) 0 Ol) 
s.... Vl Vl 
·- Vl ;.: <!'.'. < .!;: < +-' ·- 0 r.n o VJ 0 VJ rJJ 
a. I want to consult with the audit partner throughout the year 1 2 3 4 5 6 
on any potential financial reporting issues 
b. I inform the audit partner about issues after year end, or 1 2 3 4 5 6 
after a transaction has taken place (rather than before) 
c. When I develop a position thatmeets 'subjective' GAAP 
requirements, I want to maintain my position even if there 1 2 3 4 5 6 
are other GAAP..:compliant positions that the audit partner 
prefers. 
d. I want to ask for advice from the audit partner on 
, 
accounting and disclosure treatments in the early stages of I 2 3 4 5 6 developing the company's view, rather than developing 
them on my own. 
e. I prefer not to involve the audit partner in deciding how to 
account for a major transaction until after it has taken I 2 3 4 5 6 
place. 
f. I want the audit partner to find support within GAAP for I 2 3 4 5 6 
my accounting policy choices 
g. I want to give earnings guidance to the market analysts 
and/or senior executives without feeling compelled to I 2 3 4 5 6 
consult with the auditor partner first 
h. Assuming my position is GAAP-compliant, I only want to 
modify my decision on an issue ifthe audit partner finds 1 2 3 4 5 6 
my treatment to be too much within the "grey" area of 
GAAP. 
i. I would consider alternate auditors/ending our relationship 1 2 3 4 5 6 
with the audit firm/audit partner to get my way 
j. If I decide to use an aggressive, fully GAAP-compliant l 2 3 4 5 6 
method, I want the audit partner to agree with my decision 
k. I want to consult with the audit partner before entering into 1 2 3 4 5 6 
complex transactions 
1. I consider the financial statements to be a joint product 1 2 3 4 5 6 between the auditor and the company. 
m. I want my financial statements to be beyond reproach in 
.. 
their adherence toGAAP, avoiding "grey" areas whenever 1 2 3 4 5 
' 
6 
possible. 
n. I want to consult with the audit partner before making 1 2 3 4 5 6 difficult estimates 
o. I want the audit I?artner to support my decision if it is 
GAAP-compliaiit, even though there may be another 1 2 3 4 5 6 
method ofrecording a transaction that is consistent with 
best practices. 
p. I want to work together with the audit partner to obtain the 
"best" financial reporting, even if this requires changing 1 2 3 4 5 6 
the statements when I disagree with the partner's opinion 
q. I put a lot of weight on the audit partner's opinion 1 2 3 4 5 6 
PART IV 
1. Background Information: 
a. How many years of business experience do you have? Please check one: 
1-5 years D 5-10 yearsD 10-15 years D 15-20 years [I over 20 years 
D 
b. What is your current position at your company? 
CFO VP Finance Treasurer Controller Director of Finance 
Assistant VP Finance Assistant Treasurer Assistant Controller Other 
• How long have you held this position? 
1-5 years D 5-10 yearsD 10-15 years D 15-20 years D over 20 years 
D 
c. Gender: Male D Female D 
d. How many years have you had responsibility for or input to the financial 
statements? 
0 yearsD 1-5 years D 5-10 yearsD 10-15 years D 15-20 years D over 20 
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e. Are you the person (or one of the people) in your company who is normally 
responsible for discussing the audit differences with the audit team? SMART 
LOGIC YesD NoD 
• If yes, how many issues have you discussed with the audit team? 
Less than 5 issues D 5-10 issuesD 10-15 issuesD 15-20 issuesD over 20 
D 
• If no, have you been present for or participated in these discussions? 
YesD NoD 
If yes - How many issues have you been present for? 
Less than 5 issues D 5-10 issuesD 10-15 issuesD 15-20 issuesD over 20 
D 
f. Have you personally ever been aware of the Professional Practice Department or 
Quality Control/Concurring Partner becoming involved in any issues at your 
current or previous workplace? SMART LOG1-C YesD NoD 
• If yes, how many times were you aware of their 
involvement? 
------
• Overall, would you say the experience was a positive one? YesD NoD 
g. Do you feel you have an effective working relationship with your current audit 
partner? 
1 
Completely 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 
Neutral 
7 8 9 10 11 
Strongly 
Agree 
h. Do you hold any of the following accounting designations? CA D CMA D CGA D 
CPA D 
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2. Company Information: 
a. Which box( es) best describe your company?: 
Public company D Large Private company D Non traded Subsidiary of Public 
company D Public SectorCrown Corporation Other (eg. small private) ___ _ 
b. Does your company require an annual financial statement audit? YesD NoD 
c. Will you be using IFRS to prepare your financial statements? Yes D No D 
d. What are the (approximate) annual revenues at your current company? ___ _ 
e. Where is your office located? Canada D US Other (specify) ____ _ 
3. Would you like to receive a summary of the results of this survey? 
Yes D No D 
• If yes, please provide an email address for us to send it to you. 
This concludes your participation in the research study. Thank you for your time. 
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